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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This is the third report from a research program that investigates the dynamics of housing 
affordability stress (HAS) in Australia. The first report, by Wood and Ong (2009), tracked the 
housing affordability trajectories of Australians over the period 2001–06. This first study ended 
just before the global financial crisis (GFC) and did not capture the impacts of this important 
economic event on housing affordability in Australia. The second report by Wood et al. (2014) 
offered more up-to-date descriptive estimates of movements in and out of HAS by exploiting a 
longer 11-year timeframe that covers 2001–11. Not only does this timeframe allow us to 
capture the pre- and post-GFC years, the longer period of analysis facilitates analysis of 
relapse that might result in cycling in and out of HAS. 
Our third report extends the descriptive statistical profile offered in the second report by 
reporting results from numerous regression models that uncover the factors that influence the 
dynamics of HAS over the period 2001–11. The dataset employed in this report (as well as the 
previous reports) is the nationally representative Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in 
Australia (HILDA) Survey. The data’s panel nature allows us to track HAS trajectories over 
time. The measurement of housing affordability status largely follows the previous reports. An 
‘attribution’ approach is applied, which ensures that while we are tracking individuals, their 
housing affordability position is measured on an income unit basis, the latter being the 
appropriate measurement unit for housing costs. This is because critical variables that affect 
housing costs (and hence affordability), such as Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) and 
Family Tax Benefit (FTB), are measured on an income unit basis. Housing costs are defined on 
a net basis, ensuring that private renters’ rental costs are measured net of CRA and public 
renters’ housing costs are rebated rents. Income is defined on an equivalised and after-tax 
basis. While the previous two reports adopt two definitions of HAS—the 30 per cent rule and 
the 30:40 rule—we focus on the latter in this report as it is commonly regarded as a more 
robust measure of HAS than the former. To be specific, in this report we assign a person to 
HAS when housing costs exceed 30 per cent of household income and income is within the 
lowest 40 per cent of the household income distribution. 
Using HILDA we are able to track the housing affordability profile of 5047 persons over the 
course of 10 years, from 2001 through to 2011. Of the sample, 1032 persons (20%) are 
exposed to one or more episodes (waves) of unaffordable housing circumstances (their income 
places them below the 40th percentile of the income distribution, and they spend more than 
30% of their income on housing costs). Exposure to just one episode of HAS is the fate of 579 
persons (11.5%) in the sample. However, this still leaves 453 persons with experience of two 
or more episodes. 
Our regression modelling results shed light on the personal characteristics that define ‘dynamic 
affordability stress’ subgroups, defined as individuals who: 
 are especially vulnerable to dropping out of affordable housing and experience difficulty 
rebounding back into affordable housing 
 find it difficult to escape HAS, and are inclined to relapse back into HAS if escape is 
achieved 
 exhibit episodic housing affordability profiles that feature cycling in and out of HAS. 
A key finding is that low-income Australians with dependent children feature prominently in all 
the three subgroups described above. In particular, those with very young children (aged under 
five years) and dependent children in their adolescent or young adult years (15–24 years) are 
particularly prone to falling into these HAS subgroups. One might speculate that housing 
related cost of living pressures are particularly important because once children reach late 
teenage years they require separate bedrooms, and infants will similarly add to family size and 
space demands. Infants will also prompt lower employment participation from (typically) female 
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partners. Low-income migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds also feature strongly 
within these three HAS subgroups. It might be that these migrants find it more difficult to 
navigate pathways into sustainable affordable housing due to language difficulties, lack of 
familiarity with institutional practices in Australian housing markets, or discrimination in housing 
markets. Unsurprisingly, the unemployed, those not in the labour force and workers on casual 
job contracts are prone to falling into the dynamic HAS subgroups. Importantly, the self-
employed are consistently over-represented in these subgroups as well. This may be 
attributable to the variable nature of their disposable incomes. We find that variance measures 
based on self-employed disposable household incomes are roughly twice those in the rest of 
the workforce. 
Our regression models also suggest that the chances of falling into dynamic affordability stress 
groups are higher in the post-GFC years, after controlling for other factors. Our findings 
indicate that navigation out of HAS and the ability to sustain affordable housing has become 
more difficult since the GFC. 
The project findings have significant policy implications. The cuts to FTB in the recent 2014 
budget will subject those with dependent children to a greater risk of dynamic housing stress 
due to a freeze in indexation arrangements. Furthermore, because low-income private renters 
are more likely to be subject to dynamic housing stress than public renters, proposed reform 
arrangements that introduce market rents for social housing tenants who then become eligible 
for CRA would likely place social housing tenants at much greater risk of protracted and 
episodic spells of HAS. Falling rates of outright ownership among older Australians will also 
result in more persistent and sporadic HAS in later life. This will raise challenges for Australia’s 
welfare state given the importance of outright ownership as a traditional pillar supporting 
retirement incomes policy. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This is the third in a series of reports that has developed a program of research into the 
dynamics of housing affordability stress. It began with a study (Wood & Ong 2009) exploring 
the duration of Australians’ spells in housing affordability stress (HAS). It used the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey to profile the housing affordability 
trajectories of a nationally representative sample of Australians over the period 2001–06. We 
were keen to ascertain whether spells in HAS were temporary or enduring and, if temporary, 
were escapes from HAS permanent? The five-year timeframe was a limitation in two ways. 
First, it is too short for the analysis of relapse that might punctuate the housing affordability 
pathways of those evading HAS. Second, the study timeframe ends just as the Global 
Financial Crisis was about to disrupt the national economy and its housing markets. This 
shock, and the economic policy response to it, had very significant impacts on interest rates 
and house prices that are key drivers of the dynamics of housing affordability. 
Our new project exploits a longer 11-year timeframe covering the period 2001–11, and 
employs novel empirical methods to generate additional insights into the dynamics of housing 
affordability in Australia. The introductory chapter proceeds to sketch in some background 
material on housing market trends that help explain why housing affordability has become such 
an important policy issue. It then summarises the key findings from a positioning paper 
published in November 2014, and describes how this Final Report extends our program of 
research in new directions, as well as updating findings reported in Wood and Ong (2009). 
1.1 Background 
Housing affordability has become one of the more important social policy issues because of 
the widespread belief that housing costs are a growing burden for both private renters and 
home buyers. Since increasing cost burdens make it more difficult to save when renting, and to 
meet mortgage payments when purchasing housing, home ownership is increasingly difficult to 
attain and safeguard. High and rising housing cost burdens therefore pose a threat to 
Australia’s home ownership society. They also erode living standards, especially those of 
private rental households that cannot cross the threshold into owner occupation and do not 
benefit from that tenure’s asset-welfare attribute (Doling & Elsinga 2013). Finally, those with 
individual risk factors associated with homelessness (e.g. victims of domestic violence) are 
arguably more prone to homelessness if supplies of affordable rental housing are scarce 
(O’Flaherty 2004). 
In Wood et al. (2014), we reported various long-run housing market trends that document how 
changes in the affordability of housing, housing tenure and indebtedness inform these issues. 
This section extends the timeframe employed in Wood et al. (2014) by two years, a 
modification made possible by acquisition of the 2011 ABS Survey of Income and Housing. 
This is helpful because the 2011 survey lengthens the post-GFC era to four years (2007–11), 
and more firmly identifies whether trends before the crisis have been interrupted or even 
reversed.1 
Table1 below shows how housing in both the main housing tenures has become more 
unaffordable over the 30-year interval 1982–2011. Back in 1982, the typical private renter 
devoted 17 per cent of gross household income to meet rent payments. The share of income 
allotted to rent payments has increased by 6 percentage points since then (to 23%), and the 
number of households paying more than 30 per cent of gross household income in rent has 
more than doubled (from 338 000 to 787 000) (see Table 2 below).2 When our study timeframe 
                                               
1 We have also added two new analyses of long-run trends—measurement of loan to income multiples 1990–2011, 
and measurement of net housing cost ratio measures 2001–11. 
2 Population estimates are generated using households weights made available in each Survey of Income and 
Housing. 
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begins in 1982, roughly one in five households paid more than this 30 per cent threshold, but 
30 years later, in 2011, it is a little over one in three households. These measures of housing 
cost burdens do not take Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) into account. Using AHURI-
3M, a microsimulation model of the Australian Housing Market, we are able to compute rents 
net of CRA for those income units eligible to receive this subsidy, but over a shorter 10-year 
timeframe 2001–11. On subtracting CRA from gross rents, we find that between 2001 and 
2011 the median net housing cost ratio of private renters increased from 20.5 to 22.9 per cent.3 
Over the most recent decade, CRA has been unable to stem or reverse the upward trend in 
tenants’ housing cost burdens. 
Trends in the housing cost ratio of owner-purchasers (mortgagors) are similar, though the 
median housing cost burdens are lower than those typical among private renter households. 
Mortgagor housing cost burdens climb from 12 per cent of gross household income in 1982, to 
18 per cent in 2011, a 6 percentage point increase over a 30-year interval. Only 10 per cent of 
1982 mortgagors paid more than 30 per cent of income in mortgage payments, but this rose to 
21 per cent in 2011. Indeed the number of home buying households passing this 30 per cent 
threshold soared from just 233 000 (in 1982), to nearly 800 000 thirty years later. 
The secular nature of these trends is a key feature we should note from Tables 1 and 2. Each 
upswing in the housing market cycle seems to ratchet up the housing cost burden for owner-
purchasers. But cost burdens do not fall back by enough during subsequent downswings to 
push burdens lower. For example, the 1980s house price boom pushed cost burdens up to 
17 per cent in 1990; they then dipped over the next 10 years, before the price boom of the 
early 2000s took cost burdens back up to their previous peak (reaching 17% when the GFC 
hits). Post-GFC house price growth has pushed the 2011 housing cost ratio a little above 
18 per cent. The pattern is somewhat different among private rental households. For example, 
cost burdens retreated during the house price boom leading up to the GFC, before pressing 
ahead once again. A second important point concerns the GFC. Despite the scale of this shock 
to the national economy and housing markets, there is no evidence so far that any structural 
change ignited by the GFC has reversed previous trends in housing cost burdens. 
Table 1: Median gross housing cost ratio (HCR) of households, by housing tenure, 1982–2011, 
per cent 
a
 
Gross HCR 1982 1990 1996 2000 2002 2007 2009 2011 
Owner-purchasers 11.5 16.7 16.9 15.1 15.0 17.3 17.5 18.1 
Private renters 16.6 20.6 21.7 22.3 22.2 20.3 23.6 23.4 
Source: 1982, 1990, 1996, 2002, 2007, 2009 and 2011 surveys of income and housing from the ABS 
Notes: a. The unit of analysis is the household. Owner-purchasers’ and private renters’ median HCRs are calculated 
by dividing median mortgage payments and median gross rents by the median gross household income of 
those in the relevant tenure. 
  
                                               
3 These estimates are calculated on an income unit basis because CRA eligibility is determined on an income unit 
basis. Hence, they are not directly comparable to the household estimates from the ABS reported in Table 1. 
However, the majority (approximately 85%) of households comprise one income unit only. 
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Table 2: Number and per cent of households with gross housing costs exceeding 30 per cent of 
gross household income, by housing tenure, 1982–2011
a
 
 1982 1990 1996 2000 2002 2007 2009 2011 
Owner-purchasers         
Number (‘000s) 168 325 319 359 368 579 620 654 
Per cent 9.6 18.1 16.6 15.2 14.6 20.4 20.4 20.7 
Private renters         
Number (‘000s) 233 333 473 515 553 529 646 787 
Per cent 21.9 27.1 31.3 31.4 31.0 25.9 31.0 34.6 
Source: 1982, 1990, 1996, 2002, 2007, 2009 and 2011 surveys of income and housing from the ABS 
Notes: a. The unit of analysis is the household. Population estimates are generated using household weights in the 
SIH. 
These long-run patterns among home buyers reflect increasing indebtedness, with more home 
owners carrying mortgage debt later in their lives, and those with debt gearing up by securing 
higher levels of debt relative to house values. Figure 1 below shows the proportion of 
mortgagors among home owners in five age groupings at varying intervals across the period 
1982–2011. There has been an increase in the share of home owners with a mortgage in all 
age groups over the last 30 years, and this includes the 65 years and over age group. Roughly 
1 in 10 owners that have passed retirement age are now still paying off a mortgage. But the 
steepest increases are occurring in the 45–54 and 55–64-year age groups—middle aged 
Australians approaching retirement. Mortgage status was uncommon in the pre-retirement 55–
64 cohort; even as recently as 1996, less than 20 per cent remained burdened with a 
mortgage. Over 40 per cent are now continuing to meet mortgage payments despite 
approaching an age when retirement commonly occurs. In the 45–54 year cohort, mortgagor 
status has now reached 70 per cent of owners, an approximately 30 percentage point increase 
over the 30-year period analysed in Figure 1. 
Figure 2 below contrasts the loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) of mortgagors in the same five age 
bands. Once again, we find that gearing has increased in all age groups. This time the climb in 
LTVs is most pronounced in the two youngest age groups (25–34 years, and 35–45 years). 
The recent spread of flexible mortgages that allow owners to dip into their housing equity 
without moving is a probable driver (Ong et al. 2013). But in addition house prices are rising 
faster than incomes, and so households have to borrow more in order to purchase housing. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of home owners with a mortgage debt, 1982–2011
a
 
 
Source: 1982, 1990, 1996, 2002, 2007, 2009 and 2011 surveys of income and housing from the ABS 
Note: a. The unit of analysis is the person, while the unit of measurement (for mortgage debt) is the income unit 
(see Section 2.2.1 for an explanation of the attribution approach adopted here). 
Figure 2: Mean LTV of home owners with a mortgage debt, 1990–2011
a
 
 
Source: 1990 and 2011 surveys of income and housing from the ABS. 
Notes: a. The unit of analysis is the person, while the unit of measurement (for mortgage debt and house value) is 
the income unit (see Section 2.2.1 for an explanation of the attribution approach adopted here). The mean 
LTV for each year is calculated by computing the mean mortgage debt secured by home buyers against 
their home, and then dividing this by mean home value as computed across all home buyers. It is not 
possible to calculate LTVs for 1982 due to the absence of house value and mortgage debt data in the 1982 
survey. 
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The relationship between mortgage debt and incomes is documented in Figure 3 below for the 
period 1991–2011. The mortgage debt to income ratio trends over this period are striking. 
Because gearing has increased in all age groups, we would expect the mortgage debt to 
income ratios among mortgagors to rise. However, increases in mortgage debt to income ratios 
outstripped rising LTVs in all age groups. Mortgagor households aged under 65 years doubled 
their average mortgage debt to income ratios over the two decades to 2011. Mortgagors who 
have reached pension age (65 years and over) reveal an even greater appetite for debt, with 
their 2011 debt to income ratios 2.5 times those secured against the primary home back in 
1990. In the home buying, household formation and child rearing cohorts (25–34 and 35–44 
years), mean mortgage debt had already exceeded income back in 1990. They have 
nevertheless continued to spiral, climbing by a further 132 (124) percentage points among 25–
34 (35–44) year old mortgagors in the years to 2011. 
The escalation in mortgage debt to income ratios is steeper than the more gradual and less 
alarming increase in LTVs. This is attributable to the fact that while home owners have enjoyed 
windfall gains in the form of sharp increases in real house values during the housing boom of 
the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, real wages lagged behind escalating real house values. While the 
repayment risk burden shouldered by mortgagors seems to have spiraled, investment risks 
remain moderate by comparison provided the real house price gains prove to be enduring. 
Figure 3: Mean mortgage debt to income ratio of home owners with a mortgage debt, 1990–2011
a
 
 
Source: 1990 and 2011 surveys of income and housing from the ABS. 
Notes: a. The unit of analysis is the person, while the unit of measurement (for mortgage debt and income) is the 
income unit (see Section 2.2.1 for an explanation of the attribution approach adopted here). The mean 
mortgage debt to income ratio for each year is calculated as mean mortgage debt secured against the home 
owned by the person divided by the person’s mean gross household income in that year. It is not possible to 
calculate these ratios for 1982 due to the absence of mortgage debt data in the 1982 survey. 
While established owner-occupiers are now more likely to be indebted, those striving to get into 
home ownership for the first time are also experiencing growing difficulties as housing 
affordability worsens. The long-run trends (see Table 3 below) reveal a sharp decline in home 
ownership rates between 1982 and 2011, especially among the younger age groups.4 For 
example, the home ownership rate among those aged 25–34 years has plunged by 22 
                                               
4 The person-based trends in Table 3 offer different estimates of the trends in ownership from those using a 
household basis for measurement. The person-based measure calculates the proportion of the adult population that 
are home owners, while the household-based measure is the proportion of the housing stock that is owner occupied. 
If a goal of housing policy is easing people's access to home ownership, the person-based measure is appropriate. 
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percentage points. Roughly one-third of this age group are now owners, yet the ownership 
share was over one-half 30 years ago. Ownership rates have dipped from 75 to 60 per cent (a 
15 percentage point decline) among those aged 35–44. These patterns will reflect delay in 
attaining home ownership, such that it typically occurs later in the life cycle. But in recent years, 
we have witnessed declines, albeit small ones, even among the older age groups, including the 
65 plus cohort (from 2007 onwards). Delaying first transitions beyond middle age is unlikely. It 
would seem that affordability pressures are now responsible for a growing number of 
Australians that either ‘never get in’, or reach the ‘edges of home ownership’ before falling off 
and making an enduring return to rental housing (Wood et al. 2014). Population ageing was 
able to sustain population-wide ownership rates until the dawn of the new millennium, but now 
decline has set in with respect to this aggregate rate as well (see the 25+ years column in 
Table 3). The GFC has not left a noticeable ‘footprint’ because the trend declines appear to 
have continued uninterrupted, and at the same pace as before. It would seem that the long-run 
changes we have detected are ‘here to stay’, and increasingly unaffordable housing is central 
to their analysis. 
Table 3: Home ownership rate, 1982–2011, per cent
a
 
Year 25–34 yrs 35–44 yrs 45–54 yrs 55–64 yrs 65+ yrs 25+ yrs 
1982 55.5 75.4 78.3 81.9 74.4 71.3 
1990 52.6 76.4 80.2 82.0 79.1 72.0 
1996 43.3 70.6 80.7 81.1 80.0 69.0 
2000 45.1 69.7 79.2 83.2 82.3 70.1 
2002 46.0 69.4 79.9 82.4 81.2 70.3 
2007 38.5 63.8 74.6 81.8 82.1 67.3 
2009 37.7 62.1 74.5 80.9 81.8 66.4 
2011 34.0 60.0 72.4 78.7 81.0 64.3 
% point change 
1982 to 2011 -21.5 -15.4 -5.9 -3.2 6.6 -7.0 
Source: 1982, 1990, 1996, 2002, 2007, 2009 and 2011 surveys of income and housing from the ABS 
Note: a. The unit of analysis is the person, while the unit of measurement (for home ownership) is the income unit 
(see Section 2.2.1 for an explanation of the attribution approach adopted here). Person and income unit-based 
measures will tend to give lower estimates of home ownership shares as compared to household-based 
measures. For example, consider a 25-year-old woman in full-time employment living rent free with her 
parents. In person and income unit measures, the 25-year-old woman will be classified in the rent free tenure. 
But the household measure is equivalent to one that classifies according to the dwelling’s tenure status, and 
this helps inflate the ownership share. 
1.2 First report key findings 
Our first report from the 2014–15 project (Wood, Ong & Cigdem 2014) used HILDA to measure 
the housing cost ratio (housing costs as a proportion of income) of all survey respondents in 
each wave 2001–11. This rich source of information on housing affordability profiles was used 
to identify each person’s spells in affordable housing and/or unaffordable housing. Housing 
affordability stress (HAS) was defined in one of two ways. First, a person is defined as being in 
HAS when housing costs exceed 30 per cent of income. Second, we applied the more widely 
accepted definition of HAS, which is housing costs exceeding 30 per cent of household 
income, but the person has income that places him or her in the bottom 40 per cent of the 
household income distribution. A spell in (say) unaffordable housing comprises successive 
episodes (waves) during which housing costs exceed 30 per cent of income, and (when using 
the second definition) the person belongs to the bottom 40 per cent of the income distribution. 
The length of spells in affordable and unaffordable housing were analysed using life tables that 
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show when and if a person exits a spell. The analysis also drills down and examines particular 
subgroups in the population (e.g. household types, tenures and age groups). 
On investigating the length of spells in unaffordable housing we find that most are temporary; 
73 per cent of Australians in HAS are no longer living in unaffordable housing one year later. 
This rate of exit declines for those with more enduring spells, but nevertheless only a small 
minority fail to climb out of spells of housing stress five years after their first experience of HAS. 
Couples with children, and particularly those in the 35–54 age groups, are more prone to 
longer periods of housing stress. 
Once affordable housing is secured, the threat to continued presence in affordable housing is 
small. Furthermore, the danger of sliding out of affordable housing diminishes as periods of 
time in affordable housing lengthen. A randomly selected spell in affordable housing has a high 
80 per cent chance of lasting at least 10 years. The young (under 35 years of age) and couples 
with children are relatively more likely to fall out of affordable housing. A past experience of 
housing affordability stress appears to have a ‘scarring’ effect since a second spell in 
unaffordable housing is more difficult to escape than the first. 
Transitions into and out of (un-)affordable housing reflect changes in housing costs and/or 
income. We employed shift-share analysis to split year-to-year changes in housing cost ratios 
into a component driven by changes in income, and a second component driven by changes in 
housing costs. Declines in income and increases in housing costs are equally important in 
causing falls out of affordable housing. But we found that year-to-year escapes from 
unaffordable housing are typically driven by rising incomes. 
We appraised the changing effectiveness of CRA by comparing HAS among private rental 
tenants with and without the protection provided by CRA. Our estimates indicate that if CRA 
were withdrawn housing cost burdens would increase by large margins. At the beginning of the 
study timeframe (2001) we estimate that affordability ratios would be nearly 16 percentage 
points higher if CRA were withdrawn, and rates of HAS would rise from 12 to 53 per cent (in 
2011). While CRA offers significant protection, it seems to tail off during the second half of the 
time frame, and as we noted earlier in this chapter, the protection it provided failed to prevent 
an increase in housing affordability stress (2001–11). 
We drew some important policy implications at the conclusion of this first report. The discovery 
that younger couples with children and on moderate to low incomes find it more difficult to 
maintain affordable housing, and are less likely to escape unaffordable housing circumstances, 
is especially important in view of recent reforms contained in the 2014 Federal Budget. Family 
Tax Benefit (FTB) is an important source of assistance for this group of households. The cuts 
to FTB in the 2014 budget will leave young families more prone to HAS due to the freeze in 
indexation arrangements. 
The shift share result suggesting that income is primarily responsible for moves out of 
unaffordable and into affordable housing, implies that labour market policies (e.g. training 
programs, work incentive measures) could prove effective in lifting Australians out of 
unaffordable housing circumstances, provided they succeed in raising employment 
participation and hence disposable incomes. But they also indicate that subdued wage growth, 
and especially wages lagging behind rents and house prices, will impede moves out of 
unaffordable housing circumstances. 
1.3 Structure of the report 
Two key tasks remain to be completed in the second half of the project. First, our analysis of 
personal characteristics associated with enduring spells in unaffordable housing lacked the 
rigour that we can attain using regression modelling. In Chapter 3, we report results from 
hazard models of spells data that allow us to estimate the contribution that a personal 
characteristic (e.g. presence of children) makes to the chances of evading unaffordable 
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housing, after controlling for other relevant factors. Although the HILDA sample of Australians 
quickly escapes unaffordable housing circumstances, our first report did reveal evidence of a 
reversion back into HAS at a later date. A second task is the subject of Chapter 4, where we 
use regression models to identify the personal characteristics distinguishing people cycling 
back and forth between unaffordable and affordable housing. A description of methods is 
sandwiched between the current chapter and the two results chapters; a final chapter sums up 
by identifying key discoveries, their implications, and the gaps in our knowledge that future 
research could fill. 
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2 DATA AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the sample design framework underpinning the 
econometric analyses of housing affordability dynamics, the results of which are presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4. We begin by providing an outline of the main data source and analytical 
timeframe, followed by a recap of the main data sampling and measurement issues highlighted 
in the first report published from this 2014–15 project (Wood et al. 2014). Specifically, we 
discuss the attribution approach, which is central to our unit of measurement, and go on to 
define our other key measures such as housing costs and housing affordability. The sample 
design discussed in this chapter will be used to conduct the empirical techniques detailed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 and is therefore a critical phase of the analysis. The chapter is concluded by 
a description of the incidence of housing affordability stress over the study timeframe 2001–11. 
2.1 Sample design 
2.1.1 Data source 
We exploit the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics of Australia (HILDA) Survey, a 
nationally representative longitudinal dataset that provides a myriad of individual and 
household-level information relating to respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics, along 
with their human capital and labour market, marital, household formation and housing 
outcomes. The first wave of HILDA interviews were conducted in 2001 on a sample of 19 914 
individuals nested within 7682 households across Australia. Wave 1 adult respondents were 
then pursued annually for follow-up interviews. We have used data from the first 11 waves of 
interviews and have at our disposal an invaluable bank of longitudinal information that enables 
us to track individuals’ tenure transitions and housing affordability dynamics over time. We also 
make use of a suite of personal and household characteristics to profile the types of individuals 
who have experienced recurring episodes of housing affordability stress, and employ them to 
better understand which explanatory factors make individuals more susceptible to transitions 
between affordable and unaffordable housing, all else being equal. 
2.1.2 Attrition and missing values 
Sample attrition is a common feature of longitudinal data and HILDA is no exception. Attrition 
occurs when Wave 1 survey participants prematurely cease to provide follow-up interviews in 
one or more waves, either because of a major change in life circumstances such as death or 
moves overseas, or because they are no longer inclined to do so. It affects around 6700 of 
HILDA survey respondents, which approximates to around 48 per cent of the pooled HILDA 
sample. In Wood, Ong and Cigdem (2014), we conducted a sensitivity analysis to examine 
whether sample attrition affected the underlying findings generated from a life table analysis. In 
this exercise we constructed a life table on two separate samples: the first sample comprises 
individuals who provided an interview in every wave between years 2001–06, and also 
includes individuals who dropped out of the survey at some later stage (i.e. between waves 7 
to 11). The second sample is confined to only those individuals who provided an interview in 
every wave between years 2001–11, thereby omitting any individual who dropped out in one or 
more waves across the data span. Our findings from that exercise show that the hazard and 
survival rate profiles remain more or less the same across the two samples, thereby abating 
concerns of any bias resulting from sample attrition. 
Missing data is another challenge that data users must often contend with. In Wood and Ong 
(2009), the issue of missing data was particularly pertinent as it affected our key housing cost 
measures such as mortgage repayments and rental payments. In addressing this issue, Wood 
and Ong (2009) devised exhaustive algorithms to impute these missing housing cost values. 
Since the publication of that report however, HILDA has released data which provides imputed 
values for those variables where missing data is particularly problematic. We have used this 
imputed data provided by HILDA to carry out the empirical analysis. 
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2.1.3 Inclusion/exclusion rules 
We are able to track 5047 persons all the way through the data timeframe, that is Wave 1 
(2001) to Wave 11 (2011). Of these, 185 were dependents in Wave 1 who subsequently 
became independent adults during the timeframe. Hence, they are added to the sample for 
analysis from the wave in which they turn independent. A small number return to dependent 
status after attaining independence, and are excluded from our analysis as in the previous 
reports within this research program given their small number, and the added complications 
that would ensue should we include them in the sample frame. 
Some HILDA respondents live in rent-free housing and therefore pay zero housing costs. 
Those who live in rent-free employer-provided housing may be subject to wage discounts in 
lieu of rental payments. However, as per the previous report (see Wood et al. 2014), we do not 
estimate the wage discounts to proxy for effective housing cost for those residing in employer-
provided housing, due to the small number in this category. During 2001–11, between 0.2 t and 
0.5 per cent of responding independent adults resided in employer-provided housing in each 
year. As in the previous two reports, we include individuals residing within group households, 
but exclude persons with zero or negative income, boarders, the homeless and nursing home 
residents.5 
2.2 Measurement of key variables 
2.2.1 Attribution approach 
To arrive at a measure of individuals’ housing affordability status in each year, we take into 
account the housing affordability position of the income unit in which individuals reside. By 
income unit, we mean a unit consisting of one or more persons whose command over income 
is shared between members of the unit (ABS1997). This process can be described as the 
‘attribution approach’ and relies on the assumption that income sharing is prevalent among 
couples, and between parents and dependents. The income unit is deemed the appropriate 
unit of measurement when measuring an individual’s housing affordability status as it is also 
the base unit that is used to estimate CRA and Family Tax Benefit entitlement amounts, both of 
which affect housing affordability.6 
To illustrate how the attribution approach is carried out, let’s consider an income unit that 
includes a couple Tim and Amy, and their four-year old daughter Kate. Because our sample 
design is confined to independent adults, Tim and Amy are included in the sample but Kate is 
not. To estimate the housing affordability status of Tim and Amy, we first calculate their 
combined income and calculate mortgage repayments as a percentage of their combined 
income. This means that Tim and Amy have identical housing cost burdens (HCB—defined 
below in Section 2.2.2) so long as they remain in the same income unit. Let’s now assume that 
Tim and Amy divorced in Wave 5. How will this impact on the sample design and their 
individual HCB’s? Tim and Amy will both be retained in the sample but, as of Wave 5, they will 
have formed separate income units. This means they will have unique HBR values from 
Wave 5 onwards. In the event that Amy were to re-partner in Wave 8, her new partner’s 
income will be taken into account to estimate Amy’s HCB from Wave 8, although her new 
partner will not enter the sample.7 
2.2.2 Measurement of housing costs and housing affordability 
Given that we employ the attribution approach to identify an individual’s housing affordability 
status in each year, an individual’s HBR will be calculated on the basis of his/her income unit’s 
HCB and income. Individuals’ housing cost burdens are measured differently depending on 
                                               
5 For more details on these omitted groups, refer to Section 2.1 of Wood and Ong (2009, pp.11–12). 
6 Note that most households in 2011 (87%) contained only one income unit. 
7 For more details on the attribution approach, refer to Wood and Ong, 2009, Section 2.1, p.10. 
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their income unit’s tenure status. For owner-purchasers, housing cost burdens are estimated 
on the basis of their mortgage repayments. This means that outright owners have zero housing 
costs given that they have no mortgage. This is also the case for individuals living in rent-free 
accommodation. For private renters, housing costs are measured as rent minus CRA while for 
public renters it is their reported rebated rents. A person’s income is measured in terms of the 
income unit’s disposable income. This has to be equivalised in order to adjust the reported 
disposable income measure for income unit size. Hence, we assign the greatest weight to the 
first and second adult members (1 and 0.7, respectively), and the least weight on dependent 
children (weight of 0.5 for each additional child).8 
As mentioned above, the HBR is estimated on an income unit basis and is calculated as the 
ratio of net housing costs to equivalised disposable income. For private renters in receipt of 
CRA, HCB is estimated by subtracting CRA from housing costs as opposed to treating it like 
residual income and adding to income; the rationale for doing it this way is that CRA 
entitlements are dependent on the amount of fortnightly rent paid to a private landlord, and 
should therefore be thought of as a price subsidy rather than an income transfer. We employ 
the microsimulation model AHURI-3M to compute CRA eligibility and entitlements. 
Benchmarked on HILDA data, AHURI-3M takes into account individuals’ socio-demographic 
characteristics as reported in each year over the period 2001–11, including their income unit 
type, number of dependents, amount of rent paid and household income. The computation of 
CRA entitlements also factors in the income support received from other types of government 
program.9 
Housing Affordability Stress (HAS) is defined in terms of the widely-used 30/40 rule. In 
accordance with this rule, an individual is regarded as being in HAS when their housing costs 
exceed 30 per cent of their income unit’s equivalised disposable income and their income 
leaves them in the bottom 40 per cent of the household income distribution. The 30/40 rule has 
its critics. However research reported in Rowley, Ong and Haffner (2014) shows that the 30:40 
rule is a better indicator of housing-related financial stress if it is applied within a longitudinal 
context where the duration of spells in HAS is the focus. A more detailed discussion of the 
issues is presented in Wood, Ong and Cigdem (2014). 
2.2.3 Descriptives 
Of the 5047 persons tracked over the timeframe 2001–11, 20 per cent (1032 persons) are 
exposed to unaffordable housing circumstances in one or more waves (episodes) of the HILDA 
survey. The Australian population-wide10 equivalent is 1 200 914 persons. The incidence of 
housing affordability stress ranges from a low of 3 per cent in 2003 to a high of 6 per cent in 
2001. Thus, a minority experience unaffordable housing in any one year, but turnover in the 
identity of those occupying unaffordable housing mean that close to one-fifth of the sample 
both paid more than 30 per cent of their income in housing costs, and occupied a point in the 
lowest 40 per cent of the income distribution at some point in time over the period 2001—11. 
Among those facing unaffordable housing circumstances in one or more waves, the majority 
(56%) experience it in one wave only. Table 4 cross-tabulates the number of persons by the 
number of waves of exposure to unaffordable housing, the minimum being zero and the 
maximum 11. The incidence of housing affordability stress (HAS) in two or more waves tails 
off, and rather steeply. Indeed there is only one person permanently living in unaffordable 
housing circumstances in all 11 episodes, and as few as 8.7 per cent (90 persons) of those 
experiencing unaffordable housing in at least one wave are exposed to HAS in five or more 
episodes. 
                                               
8 From this point onwards, a person’s income refers to his/her income unit equivalised disposable income. 
9 For more details on AHURI-3M, refer to Wood and Ong 2008. 
10 HILDA’s cross sectional responding person population weights (hhwtrp) were used to create population weights 
for each person, averaged across the waves in which they experienced HAS. 
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Table 4: Count of persons with n episodes of HAS over years 2001–11 
Total waves in HAS Count Percentage 
0 4,015 79.6 
1 579 11.5 
2 226 4.5 
3 76 1.5 
4 61 1.2 
5 20 0.4 
6 30 0.6 
7 21 0.4 
8 6 0.1 
9 9 0.2 
10 3 0.1 
11 1 0.0 
Total 5,047 100.0 
In Table 5 below we partition the sample into three groups—those with zero episodes of HAS, 
one episode of HAS, and two or more episodes of HAS. The socio-economic profile of these 
three groups is then explored by listing the incidence of selected personal characteristics (as 
measured in Wave 1) that include a range of demographic variables, as well as vectors of 
human capital and housing variables. The column percentages in this table suggest that 
certain groups in the Australian population are especially prone to multiple episodes of HAS 
over the 10-year period 2001–11. Across the tenure groups, private renters and home buyers 
are prominent, and unsurprisingly those who were outright owners in 2001 are scarcely 
exposed at all to episodes of HAS. These tenure patterns account for the life cycle profile 
revealed in Table 5; those in the younger age groups (15–24, 25–34 and 35–44 years) in 2001 
are much more likely to be exposed to several episodes over the subsequent decade. 
But within these tenures and age groups, there are low-income people with particular personal 
characteristics (as measured in 2001) who prove particularly prone to serial exposure to high 
housing cost burdens between 2001 and 2011. Table 5 suggests that migrants from non-
English speaking backgrounds, partners in de facto relationships, households with children, 
especially infants, the jobless and finally the self-employed are all associated with serial 
exposure. 
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Table 5: Housing, locational, demographic and labour market characteristics in Wave 1 (year 
2001) of individuals by total number of episodes in HAS between 2001–11 
No. of episodes in HAS 0 1 2 or more 
 Count % Count % Count % 
Outright owner  1,564 38.95 56 9.67 20 4.42 
Owner-purchaser 1,483 36.94 294 50.78 249 54.97 
Private renter 683 17.01 175 30.22 151 33.33 
Public renter 122 3.04 33 5.7 20 4.42 
Rent free 163 4.06 21 3.63 13 2.87 
Lives in inner city 2,456 61.17 381 65.8 275 60.71 
Lives in inner regional 994 24.76 138 23.83 125 27.59 
Lives in outer regional 565 14.07 60 10.36 53 11.7 
Aged 15–24  186 4.63 67 11.57 9.93 9.93 
Aged 25–34  677 16.86 186 32.12 146 32.23 
Aged 35–44  1,010 25.16 174 30.05 158 34.88 
Aged 45–54  926 23.06 82 14.16 74 16.34 
Aged 55 and over 1,216 30.29 70 12.09 30 6.62 
Born in overseas English-speaking country 491 12.23 67 11.57 42 9.27 
Born in overseas non-English-speaking country 410 10.21 82 14.16 86 18.98 
Indigenous Australian 53 1.32 4 0.69 3 0.66 
Non-indigenous Australian 3,061 76.24 426 73.58 322 71.08 
Bad health 864 21.52 100 17.27 87 19.21 
Married 2,567 64.03 351 60.62 300 66.23 
De facto 374 9.33 89 15.37 63 13.91 
Divorced 116 2.89 20 3.45 19 4.19 
Separated 268 6.68 29 5.01 13 2.87 
Widowed 194 4.84 9 1.55 6 1.32 
Single 490 12.22 81 13.99 52 11.48 
At least one child aged 0–4 yrs 538 13.4 157 27.12 189 41.72 
At least one child aged 5–9 yrs 567 14.12 161 27.81 137 30.24 
At least one child aged 10–14 yrs 597 15 121 20.9 104 22.96 
At least one child aged 15–24 yrs 388 9.66 60 10.36 47 10.38 
High-level qualifications  924 23.02 126 21.76 76 16.78 
Medium-level qualifications  1,148 28.6 190 32.82 136 30.02 
Low-level qualifications  1,942 48.38 263 45.42 241 53.2 
Full-time, permanent contract 1,380 34.37 186 32.12 94 20.75 
Full-time, fixed term contract 156 3.89 22 3.8 16 3.53 
Part-time, permanent contract 290 7.22 39 6.74 24 5.3 
Part-time, fixed term contract 48 1.2 5 0.86 4 0.88 
Casual contract 398 9.91 76 13.13 49 10.82 
Unemployed 85 2.12 25 4.32 36 7.95 
NILF 1,243 30.96 152 26.25 139 30.68 
Self-employed 405 10.09 71 12.26 89 19.65 
Total count of persons 4,015 579 453 
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3 ARE SPELLS IN (UN-)AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
ENDURING? MODELLING RESULTS 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we model the factors influencing a person’s chances of escaping unaffordable 
housing stress, and those shaping the chances of survival in affordable housing. It extends the 
descriptive analysis in Wood et al. (2014) by using regression modelling techniques to more 
rigorously identify key variables driving transitions across the boundaries separating affordable 
and unaffordable housing. It also builds on the modelling work reported in Wood and Ong 
(2009) which analysed these transitions in the short 2001–06 period preceding the turbulence 
ignited by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). This research project extends the study timeframe 
to the longer period 2001–11. 
We use standard techniques for modelling the occurrence and timing of events, where events 
are represented by a transition from one status to another. These techniques have a wide 
range of applications in medical research fields as well as the social sciences. They include 
subjects such as survival following major surgery, recidivism among ex-prisoners and the 
length of spells on welfare program. The length of time spent in a status is commonly referred 
to as a spell, and events marking interruption to spells are the transitions the researcher is 
aiming to analyse. Each spell is broken up into a series of episodes (or waves) of equal length. 
 In this research project we analyse one-year episodes, and the events are transitions into (un-
)affordable housing. The start of a spell is the first year that the individual is recorded as 
occupying (un-)affordable housing. 11  Statistical modelling of transitions from one status to 
another are typically referred to as hazard or survival models, reflecting their origins in medical 
research. Acquiring and sustaining (un-)affordable housing over a period of time is then 
described as survival, while falling out of (un-)affordable housing is the hazard.12 The duration 
of spells in affordable and unaffordable housing are separately analysed. 
Analysis of spells data poses statistical challenges. To appreciate these challenges note that 
with longitudinal data we are able to calculate how many waves a person remains in (un-
)affordable housing. We could simply cross-tabulate the average length of these spells with 
personal characteristics and thereby uncover the relationships that we are interested in 
identifying. Multivariate analysis could also be conducted by regressing the length of each 
person’s spell in (un-)affordable housing on variables that are expected to influence the 
duration of spells. Unfortunately this standard approach is flawed; some spells used in the 
statistical analysis are completed, but others are ongoing (censored) at the end of the data 
collection exercise, but the standard approach we have described treats all spells as if they 
were concluded, and a transition to a different state (affordable or unaffordable housing) has 
been completed. An alternative hazard (or survival) modelling approach is required that 
addresses the problems raised by censored data. 
Central to this approach is the estimation of logit models to uncover the relationship between 
the conditional probability13 of escaping housing affordability stress and a range of explanatory 
variables, as well as that between the conditional probability of falling out of affordable housing 
and these same explanatory variables. The explanatory variables can take two forms, time 
                                               
11 The reliance on one-year episodes is subject to the limitation that any (un-)affordable housing spells of less than a 
year will not be captured if they occur between the annual interviews of respondents. Hence, the number of spells 
will likely be under-estimated. 
12 This is statistical convention that does not necessarily conform to lay use of the words. For example, survival in a 
spell of unaffordable housing makes less sense in common parlance. 
13 The probability of transitioning from status x to another status y in episode t having survived in status x through to 
t-1, where t=1,2,3….n is the index representing episodes. The conditional probability is often referred to as the 
hazard rate. 
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indicators and predictors. Time indicators index the episodes (discrete time periods) that 
comprise a spell of (un-) affordable housing. If the maximum possible duration of a spell is n 
years, there are n indicators 𝐷𝑡 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡 = 1,2,3 … . 𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑡 = 1 if the spell is ongoing in the 
time interval t, zero otherwise. The coefficient estimates (?̂?𝑡) generated by these indicators can 
be transformed in order to describe how the conditional probabilities evolve as an experience 
in (un-)affordable housing unfolds. This array of conditional probabilities is commonly referred 
to as the baseline hazard. When predictor variables are omitted from the logit model, the ?̂?𝑡 
represent the hazard rates in the life tables reported in Wood et al. (2014, Tables 7 and 8). On 
including predictor variables the baseline hazard is described for the reference group and 
defined when setting all the predictor variables to zero. Thus any change to the model 
specification that adds or subtracts predictor variables changes the definition of the reference 
group that the baseline hazard profiles. 
Predictor variables are measures that a priori reasoning suggests as factors that should be 
influential in shaping the chances of exiting periods of (un-)affordable housing. Once again the 
coefficient estimates ( ?̂?𝑘 ) can be transformed to obtain the increments in hazard rates 
(conditional probabilities), controlling for the other predictors in the model. The ?̂?𝑘 are more 
frequently converted into odds ratios that are more intuitively appealing. When the predictor 
variable is a dummy variable—for example, a variable such as divorced that indicates whether 
the individual was a divorcee in any Year t of a spell—the odds ratio is the odds of event 
occurrence when a person is a divorcee, relative to the odds of event occurrence when a 
person is married (the reference category).14 The odds ratio is then a measure of how likely 
divorcees are to escape from (say) housing affordability stress, relative to marrieds. If the odds 
ratio is one-half, divorcees are half as likely (compared to marrieds) to evade unaffordable 
housing in episode t, given persistent housing affordability stress through to t-1. Odds ratio 
estimates are presented in the findings section below. 
3.2 Data and model specification 
We have designed a person-period data set for the purposes of estimating hazard models. 
This data set has been described in Chapter 2. Here we focus on one feature of this data set—
censoring—as the assumptions we make about censoring are important to the reliability of 
model estimates. To illustrate the concept suppose that our task is to identify and measure the 
influence of variables determining the chances of tumbling out of affordable housing. The data 
set will then comprise people that have experienced one or more spells in affordable housing, 
and those persons will have a separate record for each episode during which he/she continues 
to reside in affordable housing. There are then two types of cases; the first are those unable to 
maintain affordable housing through to the end of the data collection period–2011. For 
example, consider a low-income individual who is first recorded as living in affordable housing 
in Wave 6 (2006) of the HILDA Survey. Imagine that the individual continues in affordable 
housing until Wave 9 (2009) when a sharp rise in housing costs pushes him or her into housing 
affordability stress, given a continuation of low-income status. We label the Wave 6 
observation as corresponding to Year 0 of an affordable housing spell; interviewees are asked 
about housing and other circumstances once a year, so the first time we record whether a 
transition has been made will be Wave 7 that is then labelled Year 1 of the affordable housing 
spell (the spell has by Wave 7 lasted one year). The individual is at risk of falling out of 
affordable housing from Wave 7, or Year 1 onwards. In Wave 9 corresponding to what would 
be Year 3 of this spell, the individual falls out of affordable housing. In the person-period data 
                                               
14 The odds of an event occurring are given by: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
1 − 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦⁄  
In hazard analyses, the quotient contains conditional probabilities. If the conditional probability is 0.8, for example, 
the odds of event occurrence are 4, which means that the event is four times more likely to occur in t than not to 
occur.  
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set, the individual has three records in which the individual is at risk, Year 1 to Year 3, with loss 
of affordable housing taking place in Year 3. 
The second type is censored spells where the individual is in our illustrative case able to 
maintain affordable housing circumstances from 2006 through to 2011, the last year of the 
study timeframe. As data collection ends in 2011, we do not know whether this person’s 
affordable housing circumstances endure beyond 2011. The hazard model retains these cases 
in the sample and so this person will have four records where affordable housing is at risk. The 
modelling approach assumes that the ‘at risk’ set in a particular year is representative of all 
individuals who would have been at risk of exiting affordable housing, had everyone been 
followed for as long as necessary to eliminate all censoring. This assumption is critical to the 
treatment of censored cases in the hazard modelling approach. 
Before setting out the model specifications, some additional sample design features should be 
discussed. First, following Wood and Ong (2009), we model first spells of (un-)affordable 
housing only, leaving a closer inspection of the issue of churning in and out of multiple spells to 
a more sophisticated analysis in Chapter 4. Second, we exclude person-periods belonging to 
those who are public renters at the start of their spells. The majority of public renters have a 
housing cost burden amounting to a maximum of 25 per cent of their assessable income due to 
the application of public housing rent setting formulae, and thus most are unlikely to move out 
of affordable into unaffordable housing.15 Third, as shown in Table 7 of Wood et al. (2014), the 
number of persons who escape from housing affordability stress declines steeply, from 984 
(78% of those in housing affordability stress) in Year 1 to just 2 by year 10. To avoid 
compromising the statistical stability of the model, we therefore truncate the dataset at Year 8 
for all spells that exceed 8 years in length. 
The variables included in our hazard model specifications are listed and defined in Table 6 
below. They capture two dimensions of time—calendar and historical time. The inclusion of 
time indicators (as described above) allows the analyst to gauge whether the reference 
person’s chances of escaping a spell in unaffordable housing (or dropping out of affordable 
housing) decline, increase or remain steady as a spell progresses, and given the inclusion of 
predictor variables. An important motive for extending the study timeframe through to 2011 is 
that it allows us to investigate the potential impacts of the most important event in recent 
economic history—the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). A (post-)GFC indicator variable is added 
to flag observations belonging to the years 2007–11. 
A second group of variables in Table 6 represents features of housing markets, including 
location. These variables are especially important because they are most likely to yield housing 
policy relevant inferences. A person’s housing tenure is relevant because mortgagor outlays on 
housing costs will decline if outstanding mortgage debt is paid off (and interest rates do not 
rise), but tenants must meet rents that typically increase over time. However, there is a caveat 
here. Mortgagors have in recent decades become adept at using flexible mortgage products to 
make in situ withdrawals of housing equity (Ong et al. 2013; Wood et al. 2013). Cost of living 
pressures can prompt owners to dip into their housing equity in order to meet pressing 
spending needs, and rising mortgage debt rather than declines is a likely consequence. 
While private rental tenants will typically experience increases in rents as their time in the 
tenure unfolds, there is protection in the form of Commonwealth rent assistance. Geography 
matters when there is spatial variation in housing prices and rents; in urban areas, prices and 
rents are generally higher because superior access to amenities and jobs inflates land values. 
We have made a potentially important change to the way we represent location as compared 
to the 2009 version of the hazard model described in Wood and Ong (2009). The socio-
economic profile of neighbourhoods can influence the opportunities and behaviour of residents 
                                               
15  Some will nevertheless transition out of affordable housing despite the 25 per cent threshold because of 
differences between our measure of income and that adopted by the state housing authority. 
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in both positive and negative ways (Rossi-Hansberg et al. 2010). The external effects could 
help shape the duration of residents’ experiences of housing affordability independently of 
residents’ personal characteristics. To take this possibility into account, we have experimented 
with four alternative versions of the Australian Bureau of Statistic’s SEIFA index.16 Broadly 
speaking, these indices rank areas according to their socio-economic status, before grouping 
ranked areas into 10 deciles; the higher the index (and decile), the higher the socio-economic 
status of the area.17 In this chapter, we report results based on the deciles of the SEIFA index 
of relative socio-economic disadvantage, as the impacts do not vary significantly across the 
four alternative measures. 
In our 2009 research project we found that mobility was a strong influence on both the chances 
of evading housing affordability stress as well as the odds of tumbling out of affordable housing 
(see Wood & Ong 2009, Tables 18 and 19). As in Wood and Ong (2009.), it is again 
represented by a dummy variable signalling whether a residential move occurred. 
The next set of variables listed in Table 6 capture the individual’s level of human capital and 
labour market circumstances. The former is represented by a three-fold classification of 
qualifications and schooling, while labour market circumstances are distinguished according to 
whether employed, and if employed, the security of this employment. Because our hazard 
model is based on a housing cost ratio measure in which current measured income enters the 
denominator, it is the long-run income prospects of the person that we need to capture as an 
influence on the duration of (un-)affordable housing spells. Individuals with high levels of 
schooling and qualifications typically have bell-shaped lifetime income profiles that encourage 
and allow borrowing in early years of the life cycle (‘mortgaging future earnings’). In those early 
years of a career, income is also relatively low, and so high qualifications could be associated 
with protracted periods of time in housing affordability stress. Economically inactive individuals 
are also likely to experience difficulties in escaping unaffordable housing, and though the 
employed are better placed, the security of that employment could be a factor as those with 
fluctuating incomes might be more prone to lengthy spells in unaffordable housing (Campbell 
et al. 2014). A series of employment types grouped according to part-time/full-time and 
contract type have been created to empirically examine these ideas. 
Income support programs commonly target particular demographic groups by either allowing 
demographic characteristics (e.g. children, age, sole parent) to determine eligibility and 
entitlements, or tailoring particular pensions, allowances or assistance to subgroups of the 
population (e.g. sole parents). A rationale is that some low-income households, large 
households with dependent children for example, face more acute cost of living pressures, with 
housing costs a relatively important source of those pressures. It is therefore important to 
identify whether particular demographic characteristics are associated with protracted spells in 
unaffordable housing, or with the risk of losing affordable housing. Table 6 offers detailed 
definitions of how we have distinguished individuals according to age, country of birth, 
relationship status, the presence of dependent children of different age and their health. In 
Wood and Ong (2009) we report that individuals born in non-English speaking countries, with a 
fractured relationship history, and parenting infant children or dependent children in late 
teenage and early adult years, find it relatively difficult to escape unaffordable housing 
circumstances. They are also more prone to tumble out of affordable housing. Assembling a 
decade-long panel data base allows us to scrutinise these findings over a longer period during 
                                               
16 The four measures are: The Index of Relative Socio-Economic Disadvantage; The Index of Relative Socio-
Economic Advantage and Disadvantage; The Index of Economic Resources; The Index of Education and 
Occupation.  
17 For a detailed description of the various SEIFA measures, see Australian Bureau of Statistics. Socio-economic 
Indexes for Areas—Technical Paper, 2011, ABS cat. no. 2033.0.55.001, ABS, Canberra, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/2033.0.55.001 
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which economic and housing market conditions have fluctuated, and welfare programs have 
become more tightly targeted. 
These predictor variables are either fixed such that they take the same value in each episode 
of a person’s spell in (un-)affordable housing (time-invariant variables), or time-varying so that 
they can take different values across episodes in a spell. Country of birth is an example of the 
former. It is necessarily fixed. In the case of housing tenure, we have chosen to measure the 
variable in a time invariant way—it is tenure in the first year of a spell. This is because we wish 
to judge whether a spell that originates in a particular tenure is more or less permanent than 
spells that originate in other tenures. With time varying variables such as marital status, the 
variable’s value will inevitably change for many individuals over the data timeframe. 
Table 6: List of names and definitions of explanatory variables 
(a) Time and calendar year 
Variable 
type 
Variable name 
Unit of 
measurement 
Time-varying 
or fixed at t0
a 
Definition 
 
Time of 
spell 
First year of spell  Dichotomous Time-varying First year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Second year of spell  Dichotomous Time-varying Second year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Third year of spell  Dichotomous Time-varying Third year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Fourth year of spell  Dichotomous Time-varying Fourth year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Fifth year of spell  Dichotomous Time-varying Fifth year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Sixth year of spell  Dichotomous Time-varying Sixth year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Seventh year of spell  Dichotomous Time-varying Seventh year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Eighth year of spell  Dichotomous Time-varying Eighth year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Ninth year of spell*  Dichotomous Time-varying Ninth year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Tenth year of spell*  Dichotomous Time-varying Tenth year in (un-)affordable 
housing  
Macro-
economic 
factors 
GFC/post-GFC period Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if observation in reference to 
years 2007–11; 0 otherwise 
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(b) Housing market variables 
Variable 
type 
Variable name 
Unit of 
measurement 
Time-
varying or 
fixed at t0 
Definition 
 
Tenure  
Outright owner 
(reference category 
in affordable 
housing model)* 
Dichotomous Fixed 1 if outright owner in t0; 0 otherwise 
Mortgagor 
(reference category 
in unaffordable 
housing model) 
Dichotomous Fixed 1 if mortgagor in t0; 0 otherwise 
Private renter  Dichotomous Fixed 1 if private renter in t0; 0 otherwise 
Public renter* Dichotomous Fixed 1 if public renter in t0; 0 otherwise 
Rent free* Dichotomous Fixed 1 if rent free in t0; 0 otherwise 
Mobility Moved Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individuals moved in the last 12 
months; 0 otherwise 
Region 
Lives in major city 
(reference 
category) 
Dichotomous Time-varying Equals 1 if the individual lives in a 
major city; 0 otherwise 
Lives ininner region  
 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in inner regional 
areas; 0 otherwise 
Lives in outer, 
remote or very 
remote regions 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in outer 
regional, remote or very remote 
regions; 0 otherwise 
Decile of 
SEIFA index 
of relative 
disadvantage  
First decile (lowest) Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the first SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Second decile Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the second SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Third decile Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the third SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Fourth decile Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the fourth SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Fifth decile Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the fifth SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Sixth decile Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the sixth SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Seventh decile Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the seventh SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Eighth decile Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the eighth SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Ninth decile Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the ninth SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
Tenth decile 
(highest) 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if the individual lives in an area within 
the tenth SEIFA decile; 0 otherwise 
 
  
  22 
(c) Human capital and labour market variables 
Variable 
type 
Variable name 
Unit of 
measurement 
Time-varying 
or fixed at t0 
Definition 
 
Educational 
attainment 
High-level 
qualifications 
(reference 
category) 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual has a Bachelors 
degree, Graduate Diploma or 
Postgraduate Diploma; 0 
otherwise 
Medium-level 
qualifications 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual has an 
(Advanced) Diploma or 
Certificates I to IV; 0 otherwise 
Low-level 
qualifications 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual has a Year-12 
Certificate or lower; 0 otherwise 
Employment 
status and 
contract type 
Full-time 
permanent contract 
(reference 
category) 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is working 
permanent full- time; 0 
otherwise 
Full-time fixed-term 
contract  
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is working fixed-
term full- time; 0 otherwise 
Part-time 
permanent contract  
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is working 
permanent part-time; 0 
otherwise 
Part-time fixed-term 
contract  
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is working fixed-
term part-time; 0 otherwise 
Casual or other 
contract 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is casual; 0 
otherwise 
Self-employed Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is self-employed; 
0 otherwise 
Unemployed Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is unemployed; 0 
otherwise 
Not in labour force Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is not in the 
labour force; 0 otherwise 
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(d) Demographic variables 
Variable 
type 
Variable name 
Unit of 
measurement 
Time-varying 
or fixed at t0 
Definition 
 
Age 
Aged 15–24 in t0 Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual was aged between 15–
24 in t0; 0 otherwise 
Aged 25–34 in t0 Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual was aged between 25–
34 in t0; 0 otherwise 
Aged 35–44 in t0 
(reference category) 
Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual was aged between 35–
44 in t0; 0 otherwise 
Aged 45–54 in t0 Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual was aged between 45–
54 in t0; 0 otherwise 
Aged 55 or over in t0 Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual was aged 55 or over in 
t0; 0 otherwise 
Ethnicity 
Born overseas in 
main English-
speaking country# 
Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual born in English-
speaking country; 0 otherwise 
Born overseas in 
mainly non-English-
speaking country 
Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual born in non-English-
speaking country; 0 otherwise 
Born in Australia and 
non-Indigenous 
(reference category) 
Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual born in Australia and 
not of Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander origin; 0 otherwise 
Indigenous Dichotomous Fixed 1 if individual of Aboriginal or Torres 
Strait Islander origin; 0 otherwise 
Health Health condition Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual has a long-term health 
condition, disability or impairment; 0 
otherwise 
Marital 
status  
Married (reference 
category) 
Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is married; 0 otherwise 
De facto  Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is in a de facto 
relationship; 0 otherwise 
Divorced Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is divorced; 0 otherwise 
Separated Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is separated; 0 
otherwise 
Widowed Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is widowed; 0 otherwise 
Single never married Dichotomous Time-varying 1 if individual is single and never 
married; 0 otherwise 
Dependent 
children 
Number of dependent 
children aged 0–4 
Continuous Time-varying Number of dependent children 
(including partner’s children) aged 0–
4  
Number of dependent 
children aged 5–9 
Continuous Time-varying Number of dependent children 
(including partner’s children) aged 5–
9 
Number of dependent 
children aged 10–14 
Continuous Time-varying Number of dependent children 
(including partner’s children) aged 
10–14 
Number of dependent 
children aged 15–24 
Continuous Time-varying Number of dependent children 
(including partner’s children) aged 
15–24 
Notes: 
a Time varying variables can take different values for the same person across waves comprising the survey. 
* These variables are excluded from the hazard model of unaffordable housing. 
# Main English-speaking countries include New Zealand, United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, US and South Africa. 
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3.3 Findings 
Table 7 below presents estimates for hazard models of first spells in unaffordable housing. 
Models 1 and 2 present estimates with and without SEIFA deciles respectively. The inclusion 
of SEIFA decile variables does not alter the impacts of the other variables in any significant 
way. Hence, we will discuss the findings of Model 1 first, before scrutinising the effects of the 
socio-economic profile of neighbourhoods. 
Under Model 1, the (conditional) odds of exiting unaffordable housing in the first year of a spell 
are 6.3 times the odds of exiting during the remaining years of the spell. This estimate is highly 
significant at the 1 per cent level. In the second year, the odds of exiting unaffordable housing 
remains high at 3.6 times the odds of exiting during other years of the spell. As per Wood and 
Ong’s (2009) model, we find strong evidence of negative duration dependence, with the odds 
of escaping unaffordable housing exhibiting a sharp decline over the years in both magnitude 
and statistical significance. 18  By the fourth year, the odds have become statistically 
insignificant. These findings also confirm the life table patterns in Table 7 of Wood et al. (2014) 
where we report that the majority of Australians in unaffordable housing circumstances escape 
into affordable housing within the initial years of the spell. 
The dummy variable denoting the (post-)GFC years is statistically insignificant, implying that 
Australians in unaffordable housing at that time did not find their chances of escape altered by 
changes in housing and labour market conditions during the GFC. While housing consumers 
might have experienced some relief in housing costs as a result of easing monetary policy and 
a slowdown in housing markets (e.g. interest rates fell, paving the way for lower mortgage 
repayments), there was an offsetting deterioration in labour market circumstances that 
adversely affected the ability to meet housing cost burdens. However, as we shall learn later in 
this report, this is the only model in which the GFC variable is statistically insignificant, so it is 
premature to rule it out as unimportant. 
The housing tenure variables suggest that the odds of escaping unaffordable housing are 
significantly higher for those renting in the private sector at the start of their spell (as compared 
to a mortgagor).19 That is, those renting at the start of their unaffordable housing spells have 
odds of exiting that are 1.7 times the odds of mortgagors. On the other hand, the mobility 
variable is insignificant. In Wood and Ong (2009), the findings were reversed in that the odds of 
evading unaffordable housing is significantly higher among movers than non-movers, while 
housing tenure does not appear to have an independent effect on the odds of exiting 
unaffordable housing. This could be because individuals who begin their spells in unaffordable 
housing as private renters are more likely to move in order to escape housing affordability 
stress, so there is some collinearity between the two variables. Home owners who wish to 
move face higher transaction costs than private renters (principally in the form of stamp duties). 
These higher transaction costs deter mobility in the home ownership tenure, while private 
renters who wish to adjust to housing cost pressures by trading down into cheaper housing do 
not face such constraints.20 Unsurprisingly, residents of inner regional areas find it easier to 
escape unaffordable housing than those living in major cities where house prices and rents 
tend to be higher. 
                                               
18 There is a sharp jump in the magnitude of the odds ratio in the eighth year, and in the case of model 2, this is 
statistically significant. However, as shown in Table 7 of Wood et al. (2014), very few people remain in the sample 
after the seventh year of the spell. At the beginning of the eighth year, only eight people remain ‘at risk’ in the 
sample, resulting in an estimated odds ratio which is spurious in nature. 
19 The sample has no outright owners, public renters or persons living in rent-free housing as tenure status is 
defined in the first wave of a spell in unaffordable housing, and housing costs of outright owners, public renters and 
persons living in rent free housing are affordable in all waves where this tenure status is applicable. 
20  The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient between the mover and private renter variables is 0.287 and 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Further analysis also indicates that among those who entered the 
sample in private rental, around 30 per cent moved residence at least once over the sample timeframe as compared 
to 7 per cent for individuals who entered the sample as mortgagors. 
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Education qualifications are generally unimportant. While employment security, as proxied by 
contract type, does not appear to affect the odds of escaping unaffordable housing, 
employment status is important. Those who are unemployed and not in the labour force have 
odds of exiting unaffordable housing that are 55 per cent and 40 per cent lower than the odds 
of full-time employed Australians on permanent contracts (the reference category). Moreover, 
the self-employed also have significantly reduced chances of escaping unaffordable housing 
as compared to the reference category. Self-employed individuals typically have lower incomes 
than those employed on job contracts. In the sample of unaffordable housing spells, we find 
that mean income unit disposable incomes are approximately $51 000 during episodes of self-
employment, as compared to $74 000 during episodes of employment with an employer. 
Among the demographic variables, ethnicity has a significant impact on the odds of escaping 
unaffordable housing. Those born overseas in non-English-speaking countries have odds of 
escaping that are 35 per cent lower than Australian-born non-Indigenous persons. Similar 
findings were reported by Wood and Ong (2009) in their model of exits from unaffordable 
housing over a shorter timeframe. It may be due to discrimination against non-English-
speaking minority groups in Australian housing markets. Alternatively, households’ ability to 
secure accurate information on housing market conditions such as prices, rents, available 
vacancies etc. may be constrained by the extent to which people interact socially across ethnic 
boundaries (Rosenbaum 1992). However, further research is required to ascertain the 
channels through which ethnicity influences persistent housing affordability stress. There are 
no statistically significant differences between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians, 
though this finding may be attributed to small sample numbers in the case of Indigenous 
persons (nine episodes only). 
Couples (whether legally married or in de facto relationships) find it easier to escape 
unaffordable housing than singles who are never married, or who have experienced marital 
breakdown through separation or divorce. This is likely due to the pooling of resources and 
economies of scale in (housing) consumption that are available to couples but not singles. 
Furthermore, separation or divorce can eat into accumulated wealth and disrupt income flows, 
hence depressing the chances of escape from unaffordable housing. 
The presence of very young dependent children is particularly important.21 Each additional 
child aged 0–4 lowers the odds of exiting unaffordable housing by 45 per cent. When 
interpreted in conjunction with the marital status variables, it would appear that sole parents 
are particularly vulnerable to prolonged periods in housing affordability stress. Interestingly, the 
presence of adult dependent children aged 15–24 years also depress the odds of escaping 
unaffordable housing, by some 35 per cent. It may be that households with adult dependent 
children face greater space constraints than those with younger children that prevent trading 
down into a smaller home to relieve housing cost pressures. For instance, adult dependent 
children are more likely to require separate bedrooms than younger children. In the case of 
very young children (up to age 4) the household is likely to experience what might be a 
temporary reduction in income, as (typically) female partners leave or reduce their participation 
in the labour market. 
The above demographic variables offer helpful insights into the types of households that are 
most vulnerable to protracted spells of exposure to housing affordability stress. But it would 
seem that one set of demographics—the age variables representing different stages of the life 
cycle—are unimportant, as each of the age variables is statistically insignificant. The findings 
suggest that factors other than age shape the chances of climbing out of unaffordable housing 
circumstances. This does not mean that the odds of exit do not vary across the life cycle; it 
                                               
21 In Wood and Ong (2009), the presence of dependent children across all age ranges was found to be important. 
However, the 2009 study was based upon the 30 per cent rule rather than the 30/40 rule. 
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implies that differences are due to variation in demographic and other personal characteristics, 
rather than age per se. 
In Model 2, we add an additional set of variables representing SEIFA deciles in an attempt to 
uncover whether the socio-economic profiles of neighbourhoods influence the chances of 
escaping housing affordability stress. Recall that higher deciles represent higher socio-
economic status. We find that those living in neighbourhoods within the sixth and seventh 
deciles have odds of exiting unaffordable housing that are some 40–50 per cent lower than 
those living in neighbourhoods in the bottom half of the SEIFA distribution. However, no further 
systematic variations can be detected because (somewhat surprisingly), individuals living 
within high (8th to 10th) deciles have similar odds of escaping unaffordable housing as those in 
the bottom half of the SEIFA distribution. Hence, the socio-economic profile of neighbourhoods 
seems to be unimportant as far as the duration of spells in unaffordable housing is concerned. 
We experimented with three other SEIFA measures; once again we do not uncover any 
systematic impact of ‘place’ upon the odds of escaping affordable housing, with most decile 
variables failing to achieve statistical significance. 
Table 7: Discrete time hazard model estimates—escape from first spell of unaffordable housing, 
30:40 rule 
Variable category Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 
Year of spell 
First year of spell  6.279*** 9.132*** 
Second year of spell  3.593*** 5.512*** 
Third year of spell  1.839* 2.701** 
Fourth year of spell  0.805 1.205 
Fifth year of spell  0.530 0.829 
Sixth year of spell  1.278 2.012 
Seventh year of spell  1.330 2.179 
Eighth year of spell  2.690 4.470* 
Macro-economic factors GFC/Post-GFC period 0.944 0.919 
Tenure type  Private renter in t0 1.714*** 1.717*** 
Mobility Moved  1.120 1.122 
Region 
Lives in Inner region  1.563*** 1.529** 
Lives in outer region 1.375 1.485* 
Decile of SEIFA index of 
relative disadvantage  
2nd decile 
N/A 
0.789 
3rd decile 0.728 
4th decile 1.046 
5th decile 0.836 
6th decile 0.471** 
7th decile 0.558** 
8th decile 1.152 
9th decile 1.115 
10th decile 0.609 
Educational attainment 
Medium-level qualifications 0.996 0.996 
Low-level qualifications 0.807 0.764 
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Variable category Explanatory variable Model 1 Model 2 
Labour market status 
Full-time fixed-term 
contract  
1.232 1.142 
Part-time permanent 
contract  
1.216 1.199 
Part-time fixed-term 
contract  
0.695 0.737 
Casual or other contract 0.851 0.833 
Self-employed 0.571*** 0.566*** 
Unemployed 0.448* 0.483* 
Not in labour force 0.596** 0.568*** 
Age 
Aged 15–24 in t0 1.505 1.591 
Aged 25–34 in t0 1.331 1.326 
Aged 45–54 in t0 1.183 1.252 
Aged 55 or over in t0 0.970 0.991 
Ethnicity 
Born overseas in English-
speaking country 
0.855 0.813 
Born overseas in non-
English-speaking country 
0.654** 0.612** 
Indigenous 0.344 0.305 
Health Ill health 0.887 0.907 
Marital status 
De facto  1.116 1.069 
Divorced 0.588* 0.542** 
Separated 0.523** 0.480** 
Widowed 1.411 1.262 
Single, never married 0.490*** 0.419*** 
Dependent children 
Number of dependent 
children aged 0–4 
0.546*** 0.519*** 
Number of dependent 
children aged 5–9 
1.023 1.036 
Number of dependent 
children aged 10–14 
0.963 0.931 
Number of dependent 
children aged 15–24 
0.649*** 0.660*** 
No. of persons  1,338 1,338 
Chi-square  331.76*** 350.39*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference categories are Mortgagor, Major City, 1st SEIFA decile, Aged 35–
44 in t0, Born in Australia, Married, High-level qualifications and Full-time permanent contract. 
Next, we report estimates from hazard models of first spells in affordable housing (see Table 8 
below). Here, the event refers to a transition out of affordable housing and therefore into 
unaffordable housing.22 Once again, we present two models, one without and the other with 
                                               
22 In this model outright owners, rent free and public housing tenants are present in the sample. 
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SEIFA variables. Following our previous approach, we first interpret findings from Model 1 
which excludes the SEIFA variables, before examining the impact of neighbourhoods’ socio-
economic profiles on the odds of slipping out of affordable housing. The odds ratio of, say, the 
‘moved’ variable, now measures movers’ odds of making a transition into unaffordable housing 
relative to stayers. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that movers are relatively more likely 
to slip out of affordable housing, whereas an odds ratio less than 1 signals that movers are 
relatively less likely to slip out of affordable housing. 
The time indicators show that the odds of slipping out of affordable housing fall as a spell 
lengthens. This suggests that the protective effect of an affordable housing spell becomes 
stronger as its duration grows. Overall, the odds ratios are small, confirming the descriptive 
analysis reported in Wood et al. (2014) and the modelling results reported in Wood and Ong 
(2009) where we confirm that the danger of slipping out of affordable housing is small. 
The structural shift that occurred in housing and labour markets with the advent of the GFC 
appears to have increased the chances of falling out of affordable housing. The (post-)GFC 
odds ratio is estimated at 3.3, indicating that the odds of dropping out of affordable housing 
since the GFC is 3.3 times the odds in the pre-GFC years. Perhaps jobs have become less 
secure since the GFC, threatening the incomes of a growing number who were once thought to 
be in secure jobs. The 3.3 odds ratio estimate is large, but it does apply to a very low baseline 
hazard (see previous paragraph), so the chances of a transition out of affordable housing post-
GFC remain modest. 
All the housing market variables are important. Those who began their spells in affordable 
housing as private renters or mortgagors are more vulnerable to slipping out of affordable 
housing than those who began their spells rent-free.23  These three groups are all in turn 
significantly more exposed to the risk of housing affordability stress than those beginning their 
spells as outright owners (the reference category). This finding is not unexpected given the 
negligible housing costs of outright owners,24 and is broadly in line with Wood and Ong’s 
(2009) earlier model findings. 
The mover variable is highly significant, and takes on a value greater than one, indicating that 
the odds of falling out of affordable housing are raised if the person has moved. It may be that 
moves during a spell in affordable housing are from cheaper to more expensive housing 
Indeed we find on closer examination that the typical housing costs of movers increase from a 
mean $8035 before moves, to $12 011 post-moves. Somewhat surprisingly, residence in inner 
regional areas increases the odds of slipping out of affordable housing by almost 20 per cent. 
This runs contrary to the hypothesis laid out earlier in the chapter—that housing cost pressures 
are greater in urban than regional areas. However, there appears to be some correlation 
between the inner regional variable and the SEIFA variables, as the former becomes 
statistically insignificant once the SEIFA variables are added to the model. Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients between the inner regional variable and SEIFA deciles are statistically 
significant, but they are small (ranging from 0.04 to 0.10). 
Educational qualifications, employment security and employment status are now all important, 
whereas the first two were unimportant in the unaffordable housing spells model. We find that 
                                               
23 A person beginning a spell living rent-free is nevertheless exposed to the risk of high housing cost burdens. For 
example, an adult son or daughter in full-time employment could be living rent free with their parents while saving a 
down-payment to help finance first transitions into home ownership. 
24 As explained in the first report of this project (see Wood et al. 2014), the housing cost burdens of outright owners 
are assumed to be zero. Rent-free persons are also assumed to have zero housing costs, but those who begin their 
affordable housing spells rent-free are more likely to transition into other forms of housing with positive housing cost 
burdens than outright owners (see footnote 23). The latter are nevertheless a relevant reference category as some 
do subsequently withdraw equity by securing a mortgage against their property. In situ mortgage equity withdrawal 
became a common practice in the early years of the 21st century, even among outright owners (see Ong et al. 
2013). 
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the odds of dropping out of affordable housing are higher among those with no tertiary 
qualifications. Job security is important; those with part-time fixed-term or casual contracts are 
more vulnerable to falling out of affordable housing than those on permanent contracts. 
Persons who are unwaged are in even more precarious positions, with odds of falling out of 
affordable housing that are in excess of twice the odds of those on full-time permanent 
contracts. Even more striking is the fact that self-employed persons appear to experience 
particular difficulty sustaining spells in affordable housing. Their odds of falling into 
unaffordable housing are almost five times the odds faced by full-time workers on permanent 
contracts. 
The demographic variables confirm that the presence of dependent children—particularly the 
very young—as well as divorced status, diminish the chances of retaining affordable housing 
status. As in the model of unaffordable housing spells, it would appear that sole parents are 
particularly vulnerable to slipping out of affordable housing. Furthermore, in line with the model 
of unaffordable housing spells, we find that those born in non-English-speaking countries face 
odds of losing affordable housing that are 1.8 times the odds of Australian-born non-
Indigenous persons. Age is also a factor; the young are most vulnerable to slipping into 
housing affordability stress. 
We uncover a few surprising demographic findings that are worthy of further exploration. It 
would appear that marrieds face greater odds of losing affordable housing status than couples 
in de facto relationships, or separated singles. Furthermore, Indigenous Australians in 
affordable housing seem less likely to slip out of affordable housing than their non-Indigenous 
counterparts, though this finding is only weakly significant at the 10 per cent level. 
In Model 2, we examine the impact of the socio-economic profile of neighbourhoods on survival 
in affordable housing. The deciles of the SEIFA index of relative disadvantage appear to be 
more important here than in the model of unaffordable housing spells. We find that individuals 
living in neighbourhoods classified in deciles 3, 4 and 7 are more likely to slip out of affordable 
housing (as compared to decile 1), and these effects are strongly significant. But there is no 
meaningful pattern to our findings here, which makes them difficult to interpret. These results 
are similar across the four SEIFA measures we experimented with. 
Table 8: Discrete time hazard model estimates—survival in first spell of affordable housing, 30:40 
rule 
Variable 
category 
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Time of spell 
First year of spell 0.00273*** 0.00190*** 
Second year of spell  0.00168*** 0.00116*** 
Third year of spell  0.00237*** 0.00165*** 
Fourth year of spell  0.00238*** 0.00166*** 
Fifth year of spell  0.00181*** 0.00126*** 
Sixth year of spell  0.000458*** 0.000314*** 
Seventh year of spell  0.000530*** 0.000365*** 
Eighth year of spell  0.000597*** 0.000413*** 
Ninth year of spell  0.000727*** 0.000502*** 
Tenth year of spell  0.000406*** 0.000279*** 
Macro-economic 
factors 
GFC/Post-GFC period 3.328*** 3.401*** 
Tenure type in t0 
Own with mortgage  3.465*** 3.466*** 
Private renter  3.723*** 3.751*** 
Rent free  2.648*** 2.675*** 
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Variable 
category 
Explanatory variable 
Model 1 Model 2 
Mobility Moved 1.836*** 1.833*** 
Region 
Lives in Inner region  1.190** 1.146 
Lives in outer region 0.756** 0.765** 
Decile of SEIFA 
index of relative 
disadvantage  
2nd decile  
 
1.433* 
3rd decile 1.778*** 
4th decile 1.840*** 
5th decile 1.413* 
6th decile 1.280 
7th decile 1.844*** 
8th decile 1.673** 
9th decile 1.231 
10th decile 1.259 
Educational 
attainment  
Medium-level qualifications 1.425*** 1.378*** 
Low-level qualifications 1.300*** 1.267** 
Labour market 
status 
Full-time fixed-term contract  0.750 0.768 
Part-time permanent contract  1.573*** 1.581*** 
Part-time fixed-term contract  2.061** 2.029** 
Casual or other contract 1.899*** 1.917*** 
Self-employed 4.817*** 4.868*** 
Unemployed 2.491*** 2.494*** 
Not in labour force 3.215*** 3.257*** 
Age 
Aged 15–24 in t0 1.878*** 1.857*** 
Aged 25–34 in t0 1.338*** 1.331*** 
Aged 45–54 in t0 0.967 0.972 
Aged 55 or over in t0 0.509*** 0.509*** 
Ethnicity 
Born overseas in English-speaking country 1.166 1.184 
Born overseas in non-English-speaking country 1.829*** 1.841*** 
Indigenous 0.464* 0.496 
Health Ill health 1.114 1.118 
Marital status  
De facto  0.645*** 0.629*** 
Divorced 1.984*** 1.958*** 
Separated 0.532*** 0.514*** 
Widowed 0.821 0.819 
Single, never married 0.758 0.757 
Dependent 
children 
Number of dependent children aged 0–4 1.634*** 1.647*** 
Number of dependent children aged 5–9 1.438*** 1.446*** 
Number of dependent children aged 10–14 1.183*** 1.183*** 
Number of dependent children aged 15–24 1.467*** 1.464*** 
No. of persons  44,009 44,009 
Chi-square  10094.18 10121.07*** 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Reference categories are Outright owners, Major City, 1st SEIFA decile, Aged 
35–44 in t0, Born in Australia, Married, High-level qualifications and Full-time permanent contract. 
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3.4 Summary 
The models presented in this chapter yield some important findings that are largely in line with 
Wood and Ong’s (2009) earlier findings. However, the current models extend over a longer 
timeframe and thus uncover some interesting new insights. 
The models of first spells in unaffordable housing show that most Australians in housing 
affordability stress escape within a relatively short period of time, though there is evidence of 
negative duration dependence. Thus, those who fail to exit unaffordable housing quickly find 
that their chances of escaping housing affordability stress decline sharply as spells lengthen. 
Mortgagors find it more difficult to manoeuvre out of unaffordable housing than private renters, 
because the high transaction costs they face impede moves that could ease housing stress. 
Self- or non-employment also diminish the prospects of evading unaffordable housing 
circumstances. Sole parents with young dependent children are particularly vulnerable to 
extended periods in housing affordability stress, as are ethnic groups from non-English-
speaking backgrounds. While the study timeframe extends across the GFC and post-GFC 
years, we do not detect a statistically significant impact. Australians in unaffordable housing 
were perhaps unable to take advantage of lower interest rates and the slowdown in housing 
markets during the GFC, because it was accompanied by a parallel decline in labour markets, 
and thus job security. Area-based socio-economic status, as proxied by SEIFA deciles, 
appears to have a negligible impact on the odds of escaping unaffordable housing. 
The models of survival in affordable housing confirm that the majority of Australians in 
affordable housing can expect to sustain it. Furthermore, the models uncover a protective 
effect as spells in affordable housing lengthen. However, ethnic groups from a non-English-
speaking background and sole parents with young children are once again more vulnerable, as 
are self-employed or unwaged persons. Here, job security also becomes important; the odds of 
surviving in affordable housing is reduced if one is on a part-time fixed-term contract or casual 
contract. Macro-economic conditions also matter. We find that the chances of sustaining 
affordable housing have fallen since the GFC. 
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4 ARE SPELLS IN UNAFFORDABLE HOUSING 
CHARACTERISED BY RELAPSE AND TURBULENCE? 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we address two issues that extend the analyses conducted in Chapter 3. While 
the hazard models of first spells in (un-)affordable housing are a helpful guide to the 
circumstances facilitating an escape from unaffordable housing, or precipitating a fall out of 
affordable housing, they ignore the future housing affordability profile that unfolds after an 
escape or fall. The model and sample designs described below redress this omission. We 
begin by asking whether escapes from unaffordable housing are permanent. Where relapse 
back into unaffordable housing occurs, the statistical analysis seeks to identify personal 
characteristics, housing tenure and location features correlated with relapse. This is followed 
by an investigation of spells in unaffordable housing that are preceded by one or more 
episodes in affordable housing. Here the focus is on rebounds back into affordable housing 
circumstances. Once again, we are keen to pin down the personal characteristics, housing 
tenure and location features correlated with rebounds. 
The timeframe for this study is now 10 years (2001–11) and therefore offers an opportunity to 
describe the stability of housing affordability profiles, and this is the second issue addressed in 
this chapter. Contemporary housing and labour markets are, in the view of some eminent 
academics, volatile and individual housing and labour market careers more vulnerable to 
abrupt and unexpected change (Clapham 2002; Giddens 1990, 1991). Considerable attention 
has been devoted to the measurement of job security and the variability of earnings profiles in 
labour studies, but these dynamic perspectives remain relatively undeveloped in housing 
studies. We aim to make a contribution in this chapter by using the HILDA panel data to 
explore cycling in and out of housing affordability. 
It turns out that these phenomena are of relevance to a large number of Australians. We 
estimate that of those making escapes from spells of unaffordable housing between 2001 and 
2011, 33 per cent relapse back into unaffordable housing at least once by 2011. Using 
population weights, our calculations indicate that 1.1 million escaped affordability stress, but 
408 000 fall back into affordability stress by 2011. Some of these Australians cycle back and 
forth between unaffordable and affordable housing. Table 9 below measures the number of 
times the boundaries between unaffordable and affordable housing are crossed by a sample of 
875 individuals who have at least one prior completed spell of housing affordability stress. It 
turns out that 36 per cent transition across these boundaries two or more times between 2001 
and 2011. This is equivalent to a population estimate of 388 000 Australians. 
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Table 9: Un-weighted and weighted frequency of transitions between affordable and unaffordable 
housing, conditional on previous spell in unaffordable housing 
Total number of 
transitions between 
years 2001–11  
Sample 1: Unweighted count of 
transitions between AFF and HAS 
(following previous spell in HAS) 
Sample 2: Weighted count of 
transitions between AFF and HAS 
(following previous spell in HAS) 
Count % Count % 
1 558 63.77  650,755  62% 
2 67 7.66  85,956  8% 
3 173 19.77  208,326  20% 
4 32 3.66  44,454  4% 
5 27 3.09  31,934  3% 
6 9 1.03  17,109  2% 
8 7 0.8  8,497  1% 
9 2 0.2  1963 0.2% 
Our journey in this chapter begins with a description of the modelling approach. The less 
technically inclined reader may wish to skip this section. It is followed by discussion of our 
findings, beginning with a relapse model that estimates the contribution made by personal 
characteristics to the chances of a recurrence of unaffordable housing circumstances. We also 
estimate a rebound model that identifies the personal characteristics important in explaining 
who of those tumbling out of affordable housing manage to bounce back in the study 
timeframe. Results from estimation of a churning model of transitions back and forth between 
unaffordable and affordable housing are then presented and interpreted. We are interested in 
isolating the variables that distinguish episodic unaffordable housing profiles, where initially 
stressed individuals subsequently cycle back and forth between unaffordable and affordable 
housing, and those with a more settled profile in which escape from unaffordable housing is 
enduring. A concluding section highlights those findings that have particular policy relevance. 
4.2 Modelling approach 
Econometric analyses of relapse back into unaffordable housing and rebound back into 
affordable housing use the same hazard modelling techniques as are described in Chapter 3. 
The main difference here is sample design. In Chapter 3 we analysed the chances of escape 
from first spells of unaffordable housing, and the hazard of falling out of first spells in affordable 
housing using all HILDA respondents with a first spell whether completed or ongoing. Here our 
focus is different and we adopt different sample designs; the relapse model is estimated for 
individuals who have successfully climbed out of unaffordable housing; it analyses the chances 
of a subsequent lapse back into unaffordable housing circumstances. The rebound model is 
estimated for those individuals who have slipped into unaffordable housing; their chances of a 
subsequent return to affordable housing are analysed. The explanatory variables employed on 
the right-hand side of the hazard models are the same as those used to estimate hazard 
models with respect to first spells in (un-)affordable housing in Chapter 3 (see Tables 7 and 8). 
The churning model is based on a count measure which is the number spells in unaffordable 
housing, conditional on completion of at least one spell of unaffordable housing. This count 
measure is transformed into a dependent variable that is equal to 0 if a person had only one 
completed spell in unaffordable housing, and takes the value 1 for those with two or more 
spells in unaffordable housing, and where the last spell in the count includes censored spells. It 
is then an indicator of the episodic nature of dynamic housing affordability profiles among 
individuals who managed to escape an initial exposure to unaffordable housing. The group of 
individuals assigned the value zero have settled dynamic affordability stress profiles, because 
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they escape HAS and do not relapse. The group assigned the value 1 have episodic dynamic 
affordability stress profiles because they churn back and forth. We seek to model the 
processes determining this variable in order to discover whether there are personal, housing 
tenure or locational characteristics that distinguish persons who cycle back and forth, from 
those with a more stable status profile and enduring exits from unaffordable housing. The 
dependent variable is dichotomous and a probit model is therefore estimated. 
4.3 Findings 
4.3.1 Relapse and rebound models 
A permanent escape from unaffordable housing is clearly preferable to temporary relief; it turns 
out that of the 1119 spells in affordable housing that followed an escape, a little over one in 
three (414 spells or 37%) end up in a relapse back into unaffordable housing. But are the kinds 
of personal characteristics influencing the chances of such a setback the same as those driving 
a fall out from a first spell in affordable housing? Table 10 below can be compared with Table 8 
in order to answer this question.25 The odds of relapse tend to be lower in later years of a spell, 
as are the odds of falling out of a first spell of affordable housing. But there are differences; for 
example, the chances of reversion back into unaffordable housing in any one year in Table 10 
are higher than those in Table 8. This implies that the risk of slipping out of affordable housing 
are greater if the individual has previously been exposed to unaffordable housing 
circumstances in the study timeframe. 
Table 10: Odds ratio estimates of relapse from affordable housing back into unaffordable 
housing (conditional on previous episode of HAS) 
 Variable type Variables  Odds ratios 
Time of spell 
First year of spell 0.0227*** 
Second year of spell 0.0143*** 
Third year of spell 0.00926*** 
Fourth year of spell 0.0119*** 
Fifth year of spell 0.00666*** 
Sixth year of spell 0.00484*** 
Seventh year of spell 0.00672*** 
Eighth year of spell 0.0126*** 
Ninth year of spell 0.00439*** 
Macro-economic factors GFC/Post-GFC period 1.394*** 
Tenure type in t0 
Owner-purchaser 1.949** 
Private renter 1.697* 
Public renter 1.996* 
Rent free 3.359*** 
Mobility Moved 1.551*** 
Region 
Lives in inner region 1.001 
Lives in outer region 0.811 
                                               
25 SEIFA variables were added to the relapse model, but as with those reported in Table 8 there was no evident 
pattern to the findings, and they are therefore omitted. However, the results are available from the authors on 
request. 
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 Variable type Variables  Odds ratios 
Demographic factors 
Aged 15–24 in t0 1.378 
Aged 25–34 in t0 0.702** 
Aged 45–54 in t0 1.103 
Aged 55 or over in t0 0.679* 
Born overseas in English-speaking country 0.92 
Born overseas in non-English-speaking country 1.497** 
  Indigenous 0.848 
Health Bad health 1.22 
Marital status and children 
De facto 0.510*** 
Divorced 0.791 
Separated 1.818*** 
Widowed 1.092 
Single, never married 1.053 
Number of dependent children aged 0–4 1.282** 
Number of dependent children aged 5–9 1.349*** 
Number of dependent children aged 10–14 1.013 
Number of dependent children aged 15–24 1.282*** 
Educational attainment and 
labour market 
Medium-level qualifications 1.198 
Low-level qualifications 1.304 
Full-time fixed-term contract 1.338 
Part-time permanent contract 1.14 
Part-time fixed-term contract 1.077 
Casual or other contract 2.384*** 
Self-employed 3.166*** 
Unemployed 1.006 
Not in labour force 2.585*** 
  No. of persons 4,656 
  Chi-square 1615.39*** 
Notes: Reference categories are outright owners, Major City, 1st SEIFA decile, Aged 35–44 in t0, Born in Australia, 
Married, High-level qualifications and Full-time permanent contract. 
Turning to demographics and socio-economic characteristics, we find that in most cases the 
variables statistically significant as determinants of the hazard of tumbling out of a first spell of 
affordable housing, are the same as those shaping the hazard of a relapse back into 
unaffordable housing. 26  There is strong evidence (statistical significance at 1%) that low-
                                               
26 There are a few exceptions; location in inner regional and outer regional areas become insignificant in the relapse 
model, as does the presence of dependent children aged 10–14. There is also a tendency for human capital 
(medium and low qualifications) and employment status (unemployed and part-time fixed and permanent) variables 
to become insignificant in the relapse model. 
  36 
income families with dependent children aged between five and nine, or 15–24 years,27 and 
especially those headed by separated or divorced parents, are both more prone to tumble out 
of first spells in affordable housing, and if in affordable housing after an episode(s) of 
affordability stress, to relapse back into affordability stress. Low-income individuals sharing this 
tendency include those who began their spell in rent-free housing, 28  moved home, were 
employed in casual jobs, or if not employed were self-employed, or not in the labour force. If an 
episode belongs to the post-GFC era, the odds of a relapse back into unaffordable housing are 
roughly 40 per cent higher than if a pre-GFC episode. 
In Table 11 below, we identify the factors important in helping those who have slipped out of 
affordable housing to rebound back into affordable housing. The sample of spells in 
unaffordable housing has therefore been selected conditional on it being preceded by one or 
more episodes in affordable housing circumstances. There are a total of 362 spells in this 
sample design and a majority 314, 87 per cent of the total, result in a bounce back into 
affordable housing by 2011. The sample size used for estimation is smaller and less balanced 
than in the relapse model, and this is likely responsible for a reduction in the number of 
statistically significant variables in the rebound model. 
Table 11: Odds ratio estimates of rebound back into affordable housing (conditional on previous 
episode in affordable housing) 
Variable type Variables  Odds ratios  
Time of spell 
First year of spell 3.778*** 
Second year of spell 4.827*** 
Third year of spell 3.316** 
Fourth year of spell 2.695 
Fifth year of spell 0.68 
Sixth year of spell 7.374** 
Macro-economic factors GFC/Post-GFC period 0.564*** 
Tenure type in t0 
Private renter 1.689* 
Public renter 9.136*** 
Mobility Moved 0.75 
Region 
Lives in inner region 0.858 
Lives in outer region 1.836 
Demographic factors 
Aged 15–24 in t0 0.29 
Aged 25–34 in t0 1.439 
Aged 45–54 in t0 1.297 
Aged 55 or over in t0 1.117 
Born overseas in English-speaking country 0.672 
Born overseas in non-English-speaking country 0.678 
  Indigenous 0.113* 
                                               
27 Infants four years or under also boost the chances of relapse, though statistically significant at 5 per cent rather 
than 1 per cent. 
28 All those who began their spell in rent-free housing had by the end of their spell moved and became a mortgagor. 
This pathway is likely associated with young adults leaving the family home and moving straight into owner occupied 
housing. 
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Variable type Variables  Odds ratios  
Health Bad health 0.905 
Marital status and children 
De facto 2.07 
Divorced 1.275 
Separated 0.643 
Widowed 2.384 
Single, never married 1.161 
Number of dependent children aged 0–4 0.565*** 
Number of dependent children aged 5–9 0.871 
Number of dependent children aged 10–14 0.849 
Number of dependent children aged 15–24 1.128 
Educational attainment and 
labour market 
Medium-level qualifications 0.749 
Low-level qualifications 1.201 
Full-time fixed-term contract 1.271 
Part-time permanent contract 1.794 
Part-time fixed-term contract 1.37 
Casual or other contract 0.8 
Self-employed 0.515** 
Unemployed 1.058 
Not in labour force 0.732 
  Observations 538 
  Chi-square 83.15*** 
Notes: Reference categories are owners with a mortgage, major city, 1st SEIFA decile, aged 35–44 in t0, born in 
Australia, married, high-level qualifications and full-time permanent contract. 
There is nevertheless important confirmation of the importance of dependent children’s 
contribution to the difficulties some low-income families experience in maintaining affordable 
housing. Those individuals living in low-income households where infants (aged between zero 
and four years) are present, have odds of returning to affordable housing that are approaching 
one-half of those living in households where dependent children are not present. We again find 
that the self-employed experience particular difficulties and we comment on this finding in our 
closing discussion below, as it is an important feature of all our models so far. And in this 
chapter we are beginning to assemble more convincing evidence that in housing markets post-
GFC, it has become more difficult to find pathways into affordable housing, or sustain ongoing 
spells in affordable housing. This time the rebound model estimates indicate that if an episode 
belongs to the post-GFC era, the odds of a bounce back into affordable housing are 44 per 
cent lower. Finally, if a spell in unaffordable housing began in public housing, the chances of a 
rebound back into affordable housing are very high. This is hardly surprising as state housing 
authorities set concessional rents at 25 per cent of assessable income. However, they can 
exceed 30 per cent of measured household income because of differences between our 
measure of income and that adopted by the state housing authority. 
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4.3.2 Probit model estimates of episodic HAS profiles 
The findings section of this chapter is concluded by a systematic analysis of the personal 
characteristics associated with episodic housing affordability profiles. We employ a person-
based sample of observations, where individuals included in the sample for estimation 
purposes are those who have over the timeframe 2001–11 escaped at least one spell of 
unaffordable housing. This selection rule generates a sample design of 1012 persons. Note 
that because of this selection rule, all 1012 persons are drawn from the low-income segment of 
the income distribution.29 It turns out that more than half (714 persons, 69.3%) of the sample 
have experienced one spell only. The probit model that we have estimated is based on a 
dependent variable that assigns the value 1 to those individuals experiencing two or more 
spells of HAS, and assigns the value 0 otherwise. Since the sample is person rather than 
person-period based, the time varying explanatory variables are calculated as the percentage 
of waves in which an indicated personal characteristic is evident. Consider divorce, for 
example; this variable is the percentage of waves in which a survey participant reports their 
marital status as divorced. Thus if the respondent responds in the affirmative in every wave the 
variable takes, the value is 100 per cent. The model aims to offer insights into the personal 
characteristics of those especially prone to sporadic spells in HAS. It therefore augments the 
relapse and rebound model analyses by exploring repeated cycling back and forth between 
affordable and unaffordable housing cost burdens. 
Probit model findings are presented in Table 12. In column 2 we list coefficient estimates. We 
can gauge the direction of each variable’s impact (positive or negative) on the dependent 
variable from this coefficient and its statistical significance (or otherwise) is indicated. But probit 
coefficient estimates by themselves are not easily interpreted and are therefore often coupled 
with marginal effects estimates, which estimate changes in the (conditional) probability of the 
outcome variable in response to a unit change in the explanatory variable, ceteris paribus. In 
the case of dummy variables, it is the predicted change in the (conditional) probability of the 
outcome variable when the dummy variable switches from zero to one. 
The model turns out to have a modest number of statistically significant coefficients, and they 
offer a modest level of predictive accuracy. Of the 305 individuals with multiple spells of HAS, 
the model correctly predicts only 30 per cent. Because the dependent variable is unbalanced, 
there being more individuals with single spells, the model is better at predicting single spells 
with a much higher 90 per cent successfully assigned by the model. Statistically significant and 
positive impacts on the propensity to churn back and forth are found for young adults (15–24 
years of age), migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds, the presence of dependent 
children (age 5–9 years and 15–24 years), the self-employed and those not in the labour force. 
These variables suggest that younger low-income segments of the population, as well as those 
with acute spending needs due to growing families, and especially if accompanied by 
precarious employment, are especially prone to episodic HAS profiles. 
  
                                               
29 During their spell of unaffordable housing each person will have equivalised disposable household income that is 
at or below the 40th percentile of the income distribution. 
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Table 12: Churning model; coefficient and marginal effect estimates 
Variables 
(1) (2) 
Probit coefficient Marginal effects 
% of waves owner-purchaser 0.000258 8.09e-05 
% of waves in private renter 0.00335 0.00105 
% of waves in public renter 0.00304 0.000950 
% of waves moved -0.00528*** -0.00165*** 
% of waves in inner regional 0.00208* 0.000651* 
% of waves in outer regional 0.000815 0.000255 
% of waves in SEIFA 2 -0.00125 -0.000390 
% of waves in SEIFA 3 -0.00338 -0.00106 
% of waves in SEIFA 4 -0.000502 -0.000157 
% of waves in SEIFA 5 0.000758 0.000237 
% of waves in SEIFA 6 -0.00650** -0.00204** 
% of waves in SEIFA 7 0.000604 0.000189 
% of waves in SEIFA 8 -0.00335 -0.00105 
% of waves in SEIFA 9 -0.00434* -0.00136* 
% of waves in SEIFA 10 -0.00332 -0.00104 
Aged 15–24 in t0 0.00755*** 0.00236*** 
Aged 25–34 in t0 0.000834 0.000261 
Aged 45–54 in t0 0.000466 0.000146 
Aged 55 and over t0 -0.00653*** -0.00204*** 
Born in overseas English-speaking country 0.000307 9.61e-05 
Born in overseas non-English-speaking country 0.00290** 0.000909** 
Indigenous Australian -0.00912 -0.00285 
% of waves in bad health 0.00111 0.000347 
% of waves defacto -0.00444** -0.00139** 
% of waves divorced -0.000284 -8.90e-05 
% of waves separated 0.000818 0.000256 
% of waves widowed -0.000988 -0.000309 
% of waves single -0.00244 -0.000764 
% of waves with at least one child aged 0–4 years 0.000778 0.000243 
% of waves with at least one child aged 5–9 years 0.00270* 0.000844** 
% of waves with at least one child aged 10–14 years 0.00121 0.000380 
% of waves with at least one child aged 15–24 years 0.00360** 0.00112** 
% of waves with medium-level qualifications 0.00178 0.000555 
% of waves with low-level qualifications 0.00114 0.000355 
% of waves with full-time, fixed term contract 0.000244 7.63e-05 
% of waves with part-time, permanent contract -0.00186 -0.000583 
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Variables 
(1) (2) 
Probit coefficient Marginal effects 
% of waves with part-time, fixed term contract 0.00273 0.000855 
% of waves with casual contract 0.00201 0.000627 
% of waves self-employed 0.00604*** 0.00189*** 
% of waves unemployed 0.00298 0.000933 
% of waves NILF 0.00510*** 0.00160*** 
Variance of equivalised disposable household income -6.16e-05** -1.93e-05** 
Constant -1.162** 
 Observations 1,012 1,012 
*** denotes significance at 0.01; ** denotes significance at 0.05; * denotes significance at 0.1. Reference categories 
are % of waves in outright ownership, * of waves living in Major City, % of waves living in 1st SEIFA decile, Aged 
35–44 in t0, Born in Australia, Non-indigenous, % of waves Married, % of waves with high-level qualifications and % 
of waves with full-time permanent contract. 
Note: Sample frame is based on a person-only dataset; it is derived from a person-period dataset comprising 
individuals who have experienced one or more spells in HAS. Variables are measured over person-periods. 
We experimented with a variable measuring the variability of a person’s equivalised household 
income over the 2001–11 timeframe because we expected those with more volatile incomes to 
be exposed to unaffordable housing on a more intermittent basis. But the expectation was not 
supported on adding the variance of income measure to the Probit model. Controls for 
neighbourhood were also added but proved to be insignificant in all but two cases. 
4.4 Discussion 
We are beginning to paint a clearer picture of the dynamics of housing affordability, with 
portraits of subgroups in the low-income population of Australians that: 
 Are especially prone to tumble out of affordable housing and have difficulty rebounding 
back into affordable housing. 
 Experience difficulty climbing out of unaffordable housing circumstances, and if escape into 
affordable housing is achieved, are inclined to lapse back into unaffordable housing. 
 Have episodic housing affordability profiles that feature repeated cycling in and out of 
unaffordable housing. 
A key finding is that Australians living in low-income households with dependent children are 
prominent in all three of these ’dynamic affordability stress’ subgroups (rebound, relapse and 
churning). But it is the presence of infants (four years and under), early school age children 
(five to nine years of age) and dependent children in late teenage or early adult years (15–24 
years) that seem to be particularly influential. One might speculate that housing-related cost of 
living pressures are particularly important because once children reach late teenage years they 
require separate bedrooms; infants and early school age children will similarly add to family 
size and space demands, though their main effect maybe in prompting female partner 
withdrawal from the workforce, and hence temporary dips in household income.30 
A second demographic group that are generally conspicuous in these dynamic affordability 
stress subgroups is low-income migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds. These 
migrants might have personal characteristics that signal precarious housing careers, but when 
                                               
30 We should also point out that if the person belonging to such households is divorced or separated (that is a sole 
parent) these patterns are even stronger. Dependent children aged five to nine years is also important, but not as 
consistently and powerful statistically as these other age groups. 
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we compare this group of migrants with the Australian born (using the full HILDA sample of 
adults) there is only patchy evidence of this. Migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds 
are disproportionately in couple households with dependent children, and are under-
represented among the full-time employed; but there is little of note in the occupations they 
work in, and they are better qualified (30% with bachelor degree or better) than the Australian 
born (19% with bachelor degree or better). These migrants might find it more difficult to 
navigate pathways into sustainable affordable housing because of language difficulties, and 
unfamiliarity with institutional practices in Australian housing markets. Discrimination is also a 
possible cause.31 
Human capital and employment status variables yielded some interesting results. The 
unemployed are a marked presence in some of the dynamic affordability stress subgroups, but 
not all.32 Those who are out of the labour force or in employment but working in casual jobs 
seem more likely to churn, and relapse back into unaffordable housing after achieving a 
temporarily successful exit from HAS. But it is the self-employed who are consistently over-
represented in all forms of dynamic affordability stress groups. They are an intriguing group 
that have rarely featured as a focus in housing studies, though they represent a sizeable 
16 per cent of the employed workforce. On comparing their personal characteristics with the 
rest of the employed labour force we uncover marked differences.33 The self-employed are 
significantly older, with a 10-year age difference (47 years versus 37 years) separating them; 
over two-thirds (69%) are married compared to less than one-half (46%) of the rest of the 
employed workforce, and there is a striking gender difference with males accounting for two-
thirds of the self-employed, but a much lower one-half of the rest of the workforce. Their 
housing tenure profile is also noticeably different with a concentration of the self-employed in 
owner occupation.34 Perhaps the most significant marker distinguishing the self-employed is 
the variable nature of their household disposable incomes, with variance measures of 
household disposable incomes that are roughly twice as volatile as those in the rest of the 
workforce.35 It seems likely that the self-employed are disproportionately located at the edges 
of ownership (Wood et al. 2013), where they juggle spending, saving and mortgage repayment 
decisions against a backdrop featuring uncertain income streams. One might also speculate 
that many of the self-employed would prefer permanent full-time employment, but have been 
made redundant, and find there is a scarcity of such jobs for those in their 40s and 50s.36 The 
self-employed are a key group as far as future research is concerned, and we take this up 
further in our final chapter. 
We also have important findings beyond those concerning individual demographic and socio-
economic attributes. With the longer timeframe available to us in this project we have 
uncovered more convincing evidence that the GFC matters to at least some housing 
outcomes. Our econometric model estimates suggest that the chances of falling into dynamic 
affordability stress groups are higher in the post-GFC years, all else being equal. It seems that 
navigation out of unaffordable housing and the ability to sustain affordable housing has 
become more difficult. The channels through which the GFC has precipitated these changes 
                                               
31 Indigenous persons are not prominent in these three groups as are the overseas born. Small sample numbers are 
a likely cause. 
32 They are absent from the group prone to cycle back and forth between unaffordable and affordable housing; this 
might reflect enduring spells exposed to high housing cost burdens that are more typical among a group with 
protracted low income when joblessness persists. 
33 As with the descriptive statistics on migrants, our data source is the HILDA sample. A complete set of descriptive 
statistics is available from the authors on request. 
34 Eighty-one per cent (69%) of the self-employed (rest of the workforce) are owner-occupiers. 
35 The variance of the self-employed (other workers) disposable household incomes is $3068 ($1453) over the 
timeframe 2001–11. 
36 We are grateful to one of our peer reviewers for pointing this out. 
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are unknown, and it is even conceivable that the GFC is not responsible, but rather other 
structural factors contemporaneous with the post-GFC years. 
Finally, we have an important negative finding to report. In this study we have sought to 
ascertain whether neighbourhood matters to the dynamics of housing affordability profiles. In 
the main we have failed to detect a direct influence using ABS SIEFA measures. This does not 
mean that neighbourhood characteristics are irrelevant; their influence could be indirect, but 
the evidence offered in this study is unable to detect systematic and direct channels of 
influence. 
These are important and novel findings. Their significance to policy and the future research 
directions they prompt are taken up in our final chapter. 
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5 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR 
RESEARCH 
The dynamics of housing affordability are a neglected subject. But the topic deserves attention. 
A short exposure to a high housing cost burden that is never repeated is of much less concern 
than persistent or episodic spells of housing affordability stress. Indeed, when we examine 
wellbeing measures, there is a clear indication that this distinction matters. In the HILDA 
sample of private renters, those with one spell of unaffordable housing lasting one year or less 
have average life satisfaction scores (2001–11) that are 5 per cent or 0.4 points higher than 
those of private renters with a spell lasting more than one year, or cycling in and out of 
unaffordable housing two or more times. Similar patterns are evident among mortgagors. 
Mason et al. 2013 also offer evidence confirming a significant relationship between housing 
affordability and mental health in Australia.37 
The research documented in this report offers key insights into the duration of exposures to 
unaffordable housing. It also identifies the socio-demographic characteristics of those low-
income Australians who find it more difficult to climb out of unaffordable housing in the first 
place; and if and when they do evade unaffordable housing, the types of low-income 
Australians who are more likely to slip back into unaffordable housing. Among low-income 
Australians, there are three groups that we can describe given the personal characteristics that 
our econometric modelling has flagged as important identifiers: 
 Households with dependent children, particularly if there is a lone parent. 
 Migrants born in non-English-speaking countries. 
 Working age individuals on the margins of the labour market—the unemployed and those 
who have dropped out of the labour force—as well as the self-employed. 
The cuts to Family Tax Benefit (FTB) in the recent 2014 budget will subject the first group to a 
greater risk of dynamic housing stress. A key feature is changes to the income free area 
thresholds of allowance payments for working age individuals, students and parents which will 
be fixed for three years, while the maximum rates will also be fixed for two years.38 As a 
consequence, eligible families’ real incomes will fall all else being equal.39 But for families in 
private rental housing, there are wider consequences because the Commonwealth Rent 
Assistance (CRA) taper will apply at lower levels of real income than would have been the case 
under indexation. This is because CRA is only removed once entitlement to the underlying 
income support payment (that is a ‘passport to’ eligibility) is lost. It will therefore offer families 
less financial support, a conclusion that is particularly significant in view of findings reported in 
                                               
37 Mortgagors with one spell of unaffordable housing lasting one year or less have average life satisfaction scores 
(2001–11) of 7.9, 4 per cent or 0.3 points higher than those of mortgagors with a spell lasting more than one year, or 
cycling in and out of unaffordable housing two or more times. The life satisfaction score is measured on a scale from 
0 (completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). To put these differentials in context, note that those with a 
long-term disability or illness have mental health levels 10 per cent lower than the rest (Wood et al. 2013). 
38 Income-free area thresholds are the levels of assessable income at which income support payments begin to 
taper off. The three-year freeze on income-free thresholds will affect Newstart Allowance, Widow Allowance, 
Sickness Allowance, Partner Allowance, Parenting Payment Partnered, Parenting Payment Single, Child Care 
Benefit, Youth Allowance, Austudy and Abstudy. For more details, refer to 
http://www.humanservices.gov.au/corporate/publications-and-resources/budget/1415/measures/families/58-000806 
39 Other changes to FTB will particularly impact single parents and large families and erode capacity to pay for 
affordable housing. From 1 July 2015, families whose youngest child is aged six or over will lose entitlement to 
Family Tax Benefit Part B. However, a new $750 yearly allowance can be accessed by single parent families in 
receipt of Family Tax Benefit Part A. The allowance will be paid as an additional component of Family Tax Benefit 
Part A and each child in the family aged between 6 and 12 years of age is eligible for the $750 allowance. Finally, 
families with three children will no longer receive the large family supplement. For details see 
http://www.humanservices.gov.au/corporate/publications-and-resources/budget/1415/measures/. 
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this project’s first report that CRA provided a very effective safeguard to eligible clients over the 
decade 2001–11 (see Wood et. al. 2014). 
The Commonwealth Government is likely to look for further savings from the CRA budget as it 
strives to achieve a budget surplus. The total cost of CRA to the Commonwealth has been 
increasing at a rapid rate. The Reform of the Federation White Paper reports that 'since 2008–
09, expenditure on CRA has increased by around 33 per cent in real terms, from $2.97 billion 
in 2008–09 to $3.95 billion in 2013–14, while the number of CRA recipients has increased by 
27 per cent, from 1.04 million in 2008–09 to 1.32 million in 2013–14' (Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet 2014, p.16). That costing will blow out further if CRA is extended to public 
housing tenants, a reform mooted in the interim June 2014 report of the Reference Group on 
Welfare Reform. Our research results suggest that a priority in such reform designs is the 
protection of low-income families, especially those with sole parents, as they appear most 
vulnerable to dynamic housing stress in contemporary housing markets. 
Housing tenure is unsurprisingly an important contextual influence on the duration of 
exposures to housing affordability stress, as well as individuals’ chances of sustaining 
affordable housing once unaffordable housing costs burdens are left behind. We find that 
public housing provides effective insurance against both protracted and episodic housing 
affordability stress. This is because it offers low-income tenants certainty with respect to rent 
payments as a share of gross assessable household income. On the other hand, low-income 
private rental tenants feature prominently among those with dynamic housing stress, especially 
if ineligible for CRA. The interim report of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform has flagged 
radical reform to current arrangements (Reference Group on Welfare Reform 2014, p.71). The 
reforms would introduce market rents for social housing tenants who would then become 
eligible for CRA. While introducing a horizontally more equitable set of housing subsidy 
arrangements, our research findings suggest that a policy initiative of this kind would place 
public housing tenants at greater risk of protracted and episodic spells of housing affordability 
stress. 
Protracted and episodic housing affordability stress is rare once home buyers attain outright 
ownership. But pathways into outright ownership are becoming more difficult because first 
entry into home ownership is being achieved later in life, and younger generations of home 
owners are regularly tapping into their housing equity to meet pressing spending needs (Wood 
et al. 2013). We are therefore witnessing falling rates of outright ownership among older 
Australians. For example, according to the ABS Survey of Income and Housing Costs, back in 
1982, 74 per cent or almost three-quarters of 55–64-year old owner-occupiers had paid off 
their mortgages; by 2012, it had slumped to 58 per cent. The fall is even steeper among 45–
54-year old owner-occupiers, from over one-half (55%) to under one-third (30%). Outright 
ownership is then offering protection to fewer middle aged and older Australian owner-
occupiers than it did 30 years or so ago, and as a result persistent and sporadic housing stress 
is becoming more common later in the life course. This is a new development in Australia’s 
housing system. It poses challenges for Australia’s welfare state given the importance of 
outright ownership as a pillar supporting retirement incomes policy (Yates & Bradbury 2010). 
There are two especially interesting groups among low-income households that our 
econometric modelling flag as prone to dynamic affordability stress—migrants born in non-
English-speaking countries and the self-employed—that warrant further research before policy 
prescriptions can be advanced. It is unclear why this subgroup of migrants is vulnerable to 
protracted and episodic affordability problems. We need further research that can pin down 
whether housing market discrimination is responsible. 
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The self-employed are a second and intriguing group. They are over-represented among and a 
rising share of low-income Australians suffering dynamic housing stress.40 Their incomes are 
much more variable than those of the rest of the workforce, and they are typically paying off 
mortgages despite an older age profile. They are part of the reason why we are witnessing the 
encroachment of affordability stress later in Australians’ lives. But whether they represent a 
concern for policy is unclear. The self-employed might be a group that regularly add to their 
mortgages in situ in order to smooth consumption or buffer income shocks. They could be 
dipping into their housing equity in order to finance business ventures. Whatever the reasons, it 
is clear that the variability of incomes is likely contributing to their dynamic housing affordability 
stress. The wider implications of this interesting finding remain to be explored in further 
research. 
                                               
40 The proportion of self-employed among the working population in HAS almost doubled over the decade between 
2001–11, increasing from 26 per cent in 2001 to 42 per cent in 2011. 
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Appendix 1: List of names and definitions of explanatory variables 
used in Poisson regression models reported in Chapter 4 
Variable name Unit of 
measurement 
Definition 
% of waves in outright 
owner (reference category) 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was an owner-owner 
% of waves in owner-
purchaser 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was an owner-purchaser 
% of waves in private renter Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was a private renter 
% of waves in public renter Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was a public renter  
% of waves in rent free Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was in rent-free accommodation 
% of waves moved Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i moved house 
% of waves in major city 
(reference category)  
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i lived in major city 
% of waves in inner 
regional 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i lived in inner regional Australia 
% of waves in outer 
regional 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i lived in outer regional, remote or very 
remote Australia 
% of waves in SEIFA index 
of relative disadvantage 
decile i 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i lived in SEIFA decile i 
% of waves in bad health Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i lived with a long-term health condition, 
disability or impairment 
% of waves married 
(reference category) 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was married  
% of waves de facto Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was in de facto relationship  
% of waves divorced Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was divorced 
% of waves separated Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was separated 
% of waves widowed Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was widowed 
% of waves single, never 
married 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was single, never married 
% of waves with at least 
one child aged 0–4 years 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had at least one dependent child 
(including partner’s children) aged 0–4 years  
% of waves with at least 
one child aged 5–9 years 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had at least one dependent child 
(including partner’s children) aged 5–9 years 
% of waves with at least Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
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one child aged 10–14 years individual i had at least one dependent child 
(including partner’s children) aged 10–14 years 
% of waves with at least 
one child aged 15–24 years 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had at least one dependent child 
(including partner’s children) aged 15–24 years 
% of waves with high-level 
qualifications (reference 
category) 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had either a Bachelors degree, 
Graduate Diploma or Postgraduate Diploma  
% of waves with medium-
level qualifications  
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had either an (Advanced) Diploma or 
Certificates I to IV 
% of waves with low-level 
qualifications  
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had a Year 12 certificate or lower  
% of waves with full-time, 
permanent contract 
(reference category) 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had full-time, permanent employment 
contract 
% of waves with full-time, 
fixed term contract 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had full-time, fixed-term employment 
contract 
% of waves with part-time, 
permanent contract 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had part-time, permanent employment 
contract 
% of waves with part-time, 
fixed term contract 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had part-time, fixed-term employment 
contract 
% of waves with casual 
contract 
Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i had casual contract 
% of waves self-employed Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was self-employed 
% of waves unemployed Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was unemployed 
% of waves NILF Continuous Percentage of time as a HILDA respondent that 
individual i was not in the labour force 
Variance of equivalised 
disposable household 
income 
Continuous Measures how dispersed an individual’s yearly 
household income (equivalised) is from their mean 
income over time; a small variance for individual i 
suggests that their household income is distributed 
near the mean; a large variance suggests that 
household income is spread further from the mean 
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